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INTRODUCTION
The State of Texas is known as the capital of capital
punishment.1 But is that reputation deserved? In a way, yes. Texas
sends more people to death row than any other state, and it executes
them far faster.2 However, in another way, it is incorrect to suggest
that “the State” of Texas is a prolific user of capital punishment.
Death penalty cases are prosecuted by counties, not the state, and a
majority of Texas’s counties have never imposed the death penalty.3 In
fact, only a handful of Texas’s 254 counties regularly seek the death

1.
See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 45 (2007) (noting that, in
2000, “Texas was the undisputed capital of capital punishment among the states”).
2.
See id. at 46 (noting that, in six years, Bush signed more death warrants than any other
governor in the last twenty-five years); see also Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas Is Bucking
Execution Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A1 (noting that, in 2007, over half of the nation’s
executions took place in Texas, in part because prosecutors, courts, the pardon board, and the
governor all pushed for expeditious executions).
3.
See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO
DEATH FROM EACH COUNTY, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countysentenced.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2010) [hereinafter TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS] (listing number of death
sentences imposed by each county in Texas).
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penalty.4 Many other states have a similarly disproportionate
utilization of capital punishment among their counties.5
The uneven use of the death penalty across the nation leads to
serious problems. Perhaps most obviously, the counties6 that often
seek the death penalty sometimes choose borderline cases and try
them very aggressively in order to win death sentences.7
Subsequently, many of these cases are reversed on appeal or, worse
yet, result in controversial executions that raise serious questions
about the culpability of the inmate and provide fodder for critics of
capital punishment.8 This criticism tends to fall on the entire state,
rather than on the county that prosecuted the case.9

4.
Id.; see also Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty and the Society We Want, 6 PIERCE L.
REV. 369, 374 (2008) (“More people sentenced to death in Harris County have been executed than
from any state except Texas itself.”).
5.
Examples abound. In Pennsylvania, the vast majority of death sentences come from
Philadelphia County, while comparably sized Pittsburgh sends few people to death row. See Tina
Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 16, 1995, at 22 (observing that of
Pennsylvania’s 194 death row inmates, 105, or 55 percent, were sentenced in Philadelphia,
where prosecutors seek the death penalty far more frequently than in Pittsburg). In Maryland, a
study found that Baltimore County murderers were fourteen times more likely to be sentenced to
death than those convicted in Montgomery County. See Ray Paternoster, Misunderstandings
Cloud Death Penalty Findings, BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 2005, at A19 (“Defendants who killed their
victims in Baltimore County were . . . nearly 14 times more likely [to be sentenced to death] than
if they lived in Montgomery county . . . .”). See infra notes 51–60 and accompanying text
(providing additional examples).
6.
Not all states utilize a county-based death penalty system. In a handful of smaller
states, the state attorney general’s office, rather than individual counties, handles capital cases.
See, e.g., Scott Sandlin, Death Penalty Out in Guard Killing; Inmates’ Defense Fund Fell Short,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 4, 2008, at C1 (noting that the State Supreme Court dismissed capital
charges because the Attorney General’s Office was unable to procure sufficient funding for
capital defense lawyers).
7.
See Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 MO. L. REV. 73,
104–05 (2007) (arguing that the current system allows prosecutors to seek capital punishment in
“borderline cases”).
8.
See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH
ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT iv (2002) (“The more often states
succumb to pressures to inflict capital sentences in marginal cases, the higher is the risk of error
and delay, the lower is the chance verdicts will be carried out, and the greater is the temptation
to approve flawed verdicts on appeal.”). Recently, consider the case of Troy Davis which caused
international headlines due to questions of his innocence. Bill Rankin & Rhonda Cook, Court
Issues Stay, Lets Davis Make his Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 25, 2008, at A1.
9.
In Texas, at least, it is quite common to hear Texas executions referred to as
“Texecutions.” See, e.g., Thom Marshall, Jury Room Camera Could Help System, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 7, 2002, at A33 (“Harris County is widely known for handing down more death
penalties than any other county, in the state that executes more people than any other state in
the Union. Texas does about one-third the total number of executions carried out in the United
States. I recently heard a fellow refer to them as ‘Texecutions.’ ”). No one speaks of a “Houstecution,” or a “Dall-ecution.”
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On the other hand, the under-utilization of the death penalty
in many counties is equally troubling. Because the death penalty is
heavily regulated, it is very expensive to prosecute capital cases.10
Many small counties faced with heinous crimes do not seek the death
penalty because they simply cannot afford to do so.11 And when
infrequent users of the death penalty do try capital cases, they often
lack the experience to comply with the highly technical rules that
govern such cases.12 This inexperience results in death sentences
being overturned on appeal years later.13 Those cases are often
subsequently retried at great expense14 to the counties that handle the
trials and the states that typically handle the appeals.15
In sum, other than the value of regional autonomy, there is
little to commend regarding county control of capital cases. This
Article therefore offers a roadmap for cutting counties out of the death
penalty system. All aspects of death penalty cases—charging, trial,
appeal, and everything in between—can and should be handled at the
state level by an elite group of prosecutors, defense lawyers, and
judges whose sole responsibility is to deal with capital cases. These
elite lawyers should be selected through a careful vetting process that
considers experience, reversal rates, and clean ethics records.

10. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan & Brenda Goodwin, Capital Cases Stall as Costs Grow
Daunting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007 (noting that the costs of prosecuting the Atlanta courthouse
shooter had topped $1.2 million before the trial even began); Kevin Landrigan, Taxpayers Could
Be Out $2M for Capital Cases, NASHUA TELEGRAPH, Mar. 27, 2008 (discussing the high cost of
two pending capital murder cases). For a recent editorial suggesting that costs should never be a
factor in deciding whether to seek the death penalty, see Editorial, Money Has No Place in Death
Penalty Debate, STAR PRESS, Sept. 21, 2008, at 2D. For commentary asserting the foolishness of
saying money has no place in such decisions, see Douglas A. Berman, Does Money Have No Place
In Any Life/Death Debate?, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y, Sept. 21, 2008, http://sentencing.
typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2008/09/does-money-have.html#comments (quoting and
criticizing the above editorial from The Star Press).
11. See discussion infra Part I.C.
12. See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
13. There is an expression among prosecutors that they are “in the business of sales, not
warranties.”
14. Consider the case of John Paul Penry who was sentenced to death three separate times,
each of which was reversed on appeal. Penry was on death row in Texas for twenty-eight years
before the district attorney agreed to a plea deal with a life sentence. Mike Tolson, An End to a
Legal Saga: Deal Keeps Penry Imprisoned for Life: Inmate Who Had Death Sentence Overturned
Three Times Apologizes, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 16, 2008, at B1. Experts speculate that the
effort to execute Penry cost tens or perhaps even hundreds of millions of dollars. See Douglas A.
Berman, Wondering About Death and Dollars in Ohio, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y, Feb. 18, 2008,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2008/02/wondering-about.html
(estimating that Penry’s defense may have cost as much as one billion dollars).
15. Although counties usually pay for trials, many states pick up the tab for appeals. Adam
M. Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to
Seek the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 861, 891 (2007).
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Although these lawyers and judges will be drawn from counties
throughout the states, they should be paid by the states in order to
reduce the pervasive funding problem that currently hinders the
entire death penalty system.16
Such a statewide system will cost a substantial amount of
money ex ante. In the long run, however, a statewide approach will
cut costs by eliminating some of the appellate issues that are litigated
at enormous expense for years after trial. For instance, the typical
capital appeal almost always raises claims that prosecutors hid
favorable evidence and that the defendant’s lawyer was ineffective.17
With an elite statewide unit of capital prosecutors and defense
lawyers, appellate judges would likely face far fewer legitimate claims
of this type and would be able to dispose of such frivolous claims much
faster. An elite team of lawyers would be more likely to comply with
the law, thus avoiding not only reversals but also the costly retrials
and subsequent appeals following a second death sentence.
Moreover, a statewide approach would go a long way toward
eliminating the geographic arbitrariness of the death penalty within
death penalty states. Wealthy counties will find it hard to convince
prosecutors based out of other jurisdictions to seek the death penalty
in borderline cases. Poor counties that previously lacked the funds to
seek death for heinous crimes will have a chance to have their cases
considered on the merits and without regard to costs.
Finally, staffing the death penalty system with elite
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges will help to restore
confidence in both the overall system and individual verdicts. Critics
of capital punishment will find it much harder to point their fingers at
overzealous prosecutors or criticize the pervasive problem of underfunded or inadequate defense counsel that currently exists in
numerous jurisdictions throughout the country.18 Providing elite

16. See David McCord, Lightning Strikes: Evidence from the Popular Press that Death
Sentencing Continues to be Unconstitutionally Arbitrary More than Three Decades After Furman,
71 BROOK. L. REV. 797, 822–23 (2005) (“In only two jurisdictions does an official with
jurisdiction-wide authority make death penalty decisions . . . These disparities are exacerbated
by the fact that funding of prosecutors’ offices is also largely at the county level . . . Likewise,
funding for indigent defense in death cases is also often at the county level . . . .”).
17. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in
Capital Cases in the Fourth Circuit, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1108 n.5 (2006) (“The three most
common species of claims in capital cases are ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Batson
claims, and Brady claims.”); see also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 131 (2007) (“Brady violations are among the most common forms of
prosecutorial misconduct.”).
18. See, e.g., Stephen Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime, But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (“Poor people accused of
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defense lawyers also will lead to more accurate results at trial, thus
reducing wrongful convictions that have remained all too common in
the modern death penalty era.19
Part I of this Article reviews the serious defects present in
county-centered death penalty systems. In particular, Part I focuses
on the variations in capital charging between counties, the
underfunding of county-based indigent defense systems, and the
problems caused by inadequate judges. Part II then articulates how a
statewide death penalty system could be created to eliminate counties’
involvement. Part II describes a selection process that would ensure
the best prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges from around the
state. Part II also explains how the formation of an elite prosecution
unit would transform capital charging from a solitary and potentially
arbitrary exercise into a more consistent committee-based decision.
Part III then details how a statewide capital punishment framework
would depoliticize the death penalty and provide for long-term cost
savings.
I. THE PROBLEMS WITH COUNTY-CONTROLLED CAPITAL CASES
A. Differentiating State Arbitrariness from County Arbitrariness
Critics have long complained about the geographic
arbitrariness of the death penalty. It is almost trite for observers to
lament how Texas is the capital of capital punishment while other
states either do not authorize the death penalty or have it in name
only. At first blush, it is troubling that a defendant has a dramatically
greater chance of receiving the death penalty in Texas or other
southern states than he would in other parts of the country.20 Yet
variations between states can be explained as a matter of federalism.21

capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the skill, resources, and commitment to
handle such serious matters.”).
19. There have been 133 exonerations of death row inmates since the Supreme Court
reinstated capital punishment in 1976. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., INNOCENCE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last visited Jan.
31, 2010) (listing number of exonerations by year).
20. I have raised this argument previously. Gershowitz, supra note 7, at 90–91.
21. See Andrew Ditchfield, Note, Challenging the Intrastate Disparities in the Application of
Capital Punishment Statutes, 95 GEO. L.J. 801, 805 (2007) (“Reference to sovereignty rights
supports interstate variations in the application of the death penalty, but it does not support
variations in the application of a capital punishment statute among different legal jurisdictions
within the same state.”).
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As a sovereign state, Texas has the prerogative to use the death
penalty frequently22 even though other states seek it rarely.23
Federalism, however, cannot explain the wide variations
between counties in the same state.24 After all, if a sovereign state has
made the decision to authorize capital punishment and enact statutes
designed to vigorously pursue the death penalty, what justification is
there for the difference between life and death to depend on what side
of the county line a criminal commits his offense?25 While it is true
that county citizens typically have the power to elect their own district
attorneys rather than accept officials appointed by the state, those
prosecutors act on behalf of the state, not the county, in criminal
cases.
Moreover, all county prosecutors are obligated to enforce the
same state law. While every criminal statute necessarily leaves some
room for interpretation at the margins, the Supreme Court has been
firm about the need for death penalty statutes to be clear and capable
of consistent application.26 For instance, the Court has demanded that
the statutory aggravating factors making a defendant death eligible
be narrowly tailored so as to separate death-worthy cases from
ordinary murders.27 Such a requirement is seemingly inconsistent
with a framework that gives prosecutors in different parts of a state
great discretion to utilize the same statute in opposite fashions.

22. See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1834 (2005) (observing and lamenting how
decentralized criminal justice encourages jurisdictions to harshen their criminal laws in order to
drive criminals to other jurisdictions).
23. For instance, Colorado has executed one person since 1976 and presently has only three
people on death row awaiting execution. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (click on Colorado using the map or drop-down
menu) (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
24. Ditchfield, supra note 21, at 805.
25. Counties are not treated as separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes. See
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392 (1970) (forbidding a second trial by state prosecutors after
defendant was first prosecuted for the same offense by county prosecutors).
26. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Judicial Developments in Capital Punishment
Law, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 47, 57–59 (James R. Acker et al.
eds., 1998) (discussing the Court’s “narrowing” doctrine). But see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital
Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 364–68 (1998) (arguing that the Court has
not followed through on its demand for narrow aggravating factors).
27. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 359–60 (1988) (holding unconstitutionally
vague under the Eighth Amendment the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating
circumstance of the Oklahoma death penalty statute because it did not provide sufficient
guidance for the jury to impose the death penalty); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)
(reversing the petitioner’s death sentence because there was “no principled way to distinguish
this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not”).
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Counties’ autonomy to prosecute cases as they see fit is so
tenuous that some states even have statutes authorizing state officials
to wrestle cases away from county prosecutors.28 For instance, when
the Bronx County District Attorney declined to seek the death penalty
in a high-profile case, the Governor of New York accused him of
refusing to enforce state law.29 The Governor turned the case over to
the state attorney general, who subsequently filed a notice to seek the
death penalty.30 Some states have gone even further and abolished
county prosecution units altogether.31 Indeed, states actually have the
authority to abolish the counties themselves if they so desire.32 There
seems little justification to tolerate arbitrariness in the application of
the death penalty between counties of the same state. Yet that is
exactly what happens throughout the United States.
B. Wide Disparities in Application of the Death Penalty Within States
While state legislatures authorize capital punishment and
draft the statutes under which it will be imposed, actual enforcement
typically falls to county prosecutors. And within individual states,
counties often have vastly different practices in determining whether
to seek the death penalty.
The widest variations between counties’ use of the death
penalty appear to exist in Pennsylvania. Although Pennsylvania has
only carried out three executions since it reenacted its death penalty

28. See John A. Horowitz, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a
Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2571, 2587–92
(1997) (discussing how local district attorneys in California and Colorado are supervised by their
states’ attorneys general and how the attorneys general have supersedure power to remove cases
from the local prosecutors).
29. See id. at 2582–84 (recounting Governor Pataki’s removal of District Attorney Johnson’s
discretion to seek the death penalty in the Diaz case).
30. Id.
31. In Delaware and Rhode Island, for instance, the state attorney general’s office, rather
than county prosecutors, handle all of the states’ criminal cases. Delaware Attorney General,
Divisions & Units: Criminal Division, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/office/criminal.shtml
(last visited Jan. 31, 2010); State of Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General, Civil and
Criminal Division, http://www.riag.state.ri.us/civilcriminal/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). Rhode
Island does not authorize capital punishment. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE
DATABASE, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (click on Rhode Island using the map
or drop-down menu) (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
32. See Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34
HOUSTON L. REV. 289, 302 (1997) (recounting how the State of Alabama adopted a constitutional
amendment in the 1950s to abolish Macon County “if necessary” to prevent blacks from voting).
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in 1974,33 it presently has 223 inmates on death row.34 Roughly half of
those inmates—106—came from Philadelphia County,35 where the
longtime district attorney36 has said that she seeks the death penalty
as often as possible.37 Although Philadelphia County accounts for
about 10 percent of Pennsylvania’s population, it is responsible for 48
percent of inmates on death row. By contrast, Allegheny County,
which includes Pittsburgh and has a nearly identical population, has
only eleven inmates on death row. The following table illustrates how
Philadelphia County is a striking outlier in Pennsylvania in regards to
capital punishment:
Jurisdiction

Entire State of
Pennsylvania

People Sent
to Death
Row38
223

12,448,279

Percentage of
Total State
Population
100%

Percentage
of Death
Row
100%

Population
39

Philadelphia
County, PA

106

1,447,395

12%

48%

Allegheny
County, PA

10

1,215,103

10%

4%

Texas likewise has wide variations in its counties’ application
of capital punishment. Between 1976, when the Supreme Court

33. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org
/state_by_state (click on Pennsylvania using the map or drop-down menu) (last visited Jan. 31,
2010).
34. See PA. DEP’T OF CORR., PERSONS SENTENCED TO EXECUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA AS OF
NOVEMBER 2, 2009, available at http://www.cor.state.pa.us/portal/lib/portal/Execution_List.pdf
[hereinafter PDC, PERSONS SENTENCED].
35. Id.
36. Lynne Abraham has served as Philadelphia County District Attorney since 1991. City of
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, Meet the District Attorney, http://www.
phila.gov/districtattorney/AboutUs/meetTheDA.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
37. See Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 22 (“Abraham’s office seeks death virtually as often as
the law will allow.”); see also William C. Smith, A Tale of Two Cities, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan.
15, 1997, at 1 (explaining that the difference is due in part to the higher murder rate in
Philadelphia but in greater part to the fact that the “Philadelphia D.A.’s office is much more
aggressive in seeking the death penalty”).
38. PDC, PERSONS SENTENCED, supra note 34.
39. All populations are taken from the estimated 2008 Census. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: PENNSYLVANIA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
42000.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (follow “Allegheny” or “Philadelphia” hyperlink under
“Pennsylvania counties”).
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reinstated capital punishment,40 and December 2008, Texas sent over
a thousand inmates to death row.41 Remarkably, even though Texas
has 254 counties, a single county accounted for 280 of the deathsentenced inmates.42 Harris County, which is home to the nation’s
fourth-largest city (Houston), accounts for 16 percent of Texas’s
population, but 28 percent of its death sentences.43 When three
additional counties—Bexar, Dallas, and Tarrant—are added to Harris
County, those four localities account for 51 percent of Texas’s death
sentences, but only 40 percent of its population.44 Adding the death
sentences from fourteen additional counties accounts for roughly 75
percent of Texas’s total death sentences.45 By contrast, there are more
than 130 Texas counties that have never sent an inmate to death row
in the last three decades.46
In Maryland, the city of Baltimore has a high crime rate but
rarely seeks the death penalty.47 By contrast, neighboring Baltimore
County, which is a separate jurisdiction with dramatically fewer
homicides, seeks the death penalty with much greater frequency.48
One study found that murder defendants in Baltimore County were

40. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (“We now hold that the punishment of
death does not invariably violate the Constitution.”).
41. See TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS, supra note 3 (listing 1,004 offenders
sentenced to death as of December 31, 2008). Of course, many of these death sentences were
reversed and did not result in executions.
42. Id.
43. Id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48201.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). Although
revealing, these numbers do not tell the full story. For many years, Harris County sought the
death penalty so aggressively that it had a comparatively low success rate at trial. For instance,
in 1999, prosecutors only won death sentences in 53 percent of the cases where they sought
death. See Mary Flood, What Price Justice?: Gary Graham Case Fuels Debate Over Appointed
Attorneys, HOUSTON CHRON., July 1, 2000, at A1. A Houston Chronicle study found that during
the 1980s and 1990s, Dallas County prosecutors won death sentences in 94 percent of the cases
in which it was sought compared with 75 percent in Harris County. See Mike Tolson, A Deadly
Distinction: Harris County Is a Pipeline to Death Row, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 5, 2001, at A1. In
2008, for the first time in three decades, Harris County did not sentence a single defendant to
death. Michael Graczyk, Texas Sentences 9 To Die in ’08, Fewest in Decades, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec.
4, 2008.
44. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: TEXAS, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (follow “Bexar,” “Dallas,” “Harris,” or
“Tarrant” hyperlink under “Texas counties”).
45. See TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS, supra note 3 (listing Texas death penalties
by county). The fourteen additional counties are: Bowie, Brazos, Cameron, Collin, El Paso,
Hidalgo, Jefferson, Lubbock, McLennan, Montgomery, Nueces, Potter, Smith, and Travis.
46. Id.
47. See Lori Montgomery, Md. Questioning Local Extremes on Death Penalty, WASH. POST,
May 12, 2002, at C1 (indicating that Baltimore seeks the death penalty infrequently).
48. See id. (comparing Baltimore and Baltimore County).
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twenty-three times more likely to be sentenced to death than in
Baltimore City.49 The same study also found that Baltimore County
prosecutors sought the death penalty far more often than prosecutors
in Montgomery County and Prince George’s County, both of which are
only a short drive from Baltimore.50
Before New York’s highest court held that state’s death penalty
statute unconstitutional,51 prosecutors from upstate counties sought
the death penalty “aggressively.”52 Although upstate jurisdictions
accounted for only 20 percent of New York’s murders, they accounted
for 65 percent of the state’s capital prosecutions.53 By contrast,
prosecutors in New York City rarely sought the death penalty; the
Bronx District Attorney refused to seek it at all.54
In Ohio, the Hamilton County District Attorney’s Office (based
out of Cincinnati) has pursued the death penalty more aggressively
than the Franklin County District Attorney’s Office (which includes
the larger city of Columbus).55 Even though Franklin County has
200,000 more residents than Hamilton County,56 it had only one-third
as many inmates on death row as of December 2008.57
In Tennessee, the Davidson County District Attorney’s Office
(which is home to Nashville) seeks the death penalty less often than
the Shelby County District Attorney’s Office (which includes the city
of Memphis).58 There are three times as many inmates on death row

49. Paternoster, supra note 5, at A19.
50. Id.
51. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 361 (N.Y. 2004) (holding jury instruction
unconstitutional).
52. Adam Nossiter, Balking Prosecutors: A Door Opens to Death Row Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at 27.
53. THE CAPITAL DEFENDER OFFICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK STATE: STATISTICS
FROM EIGHT YEARS OF REPRESENTATION (2003), available at http://www.nycdo.org/8yr.html.
54. See Nossiter, supra note 52 (noting the Bronx District Attorney’s intention not to seek
the death penalty after New York’s 1995 statute took effect).
55. See Richard Willing & Gary Fields, Geography of the Death Penalty, USA TODAY, Dec.
20, 1999, at A1 (recounting the Ohio disparity, as well as variations in other states).
56. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: FRANKLIN COUNTY,
OHIO (2009), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/39049.html (listing the population of
Franklin County), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: HAMILTON
COUNTY, OHIO (2009), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/39061.html (listing the
population of Hamilton County).
57. See Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Death Row Inmates,
http://www.drc.state.oh.us/Public/deathrow.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (including a list of
inmates indicating that there were thirty-six from Hamilton County and twelve from Franklin
County).
58. See John M. Scheb II, William Lyons & Kristin A. Wagers, Race, Prosecutors and Juries:
The Death Penalty in Tennessee, 29 JUST. SYST. J. 338, 345 (2008) (“In Shelby County, which
contains Memphis, prosecutors sought the death penalty 52 percent of the time, while in
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from Shelby County than there are from Davidson County,59 despite
the fact that the former has only a 44 percent greater general
population than the latter.60
As these and other61 examples indicate, throughout the country
there are wide variations in the use of the death penalty between
counties of the same state.
C. Explaining the Discrepancies between Counties
At the outset, I should be clear that I do not mean to suggest
that the district attorneys who frequently seek the death penalty are
bloodthirsty, nor that those who use it sparingly are soft on crime.
One county might use the death penalty more frequently because its
chief prosecutor genuinely believes it is merited.62 There are also
obvious differences in crime rates between different counties of the
same state, even if they are comparably sized.63 In Pennsylvania,
Allegheny County is nearly as populated as Philadelphia County, yet
the latter has more than four times as many murders in an average
year.64
Still, even when considering varying crime rates and legitimate
differences of opinion as to which crimes are worthy of death, it is
hard to explain the wide variations in counties’ use of the death
penalty. Are there really ten times as many death-eligible murders in
Philadelphia County as there are in Allegheny County? Are there

Davidson County (Nashville) prosecutors pursued capital punishment only 12 percent of the
time.”).
59. See Tennessee Department of Corrections, Death Row Facts, http://www.tennessee.
gov/correction/deathfacts.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (indicating that there are thirty-six
inmates on death row from Shelby County and eleven from Davidson County).
60. The most recent estimates were that Davidson County’s population was 626,144 and
Shelby County’s population was 906,825. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS:
DAVISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE (2009), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/47/47037.html; U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE (2009),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/47/47157.html.
61. See, e.g., Joseph R. McCarthy, Note, Implications of County Variance in New Jersey
Capital Murder Cases: Arbitrary Decision-Making by County Prosecutors, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 969, 980–83 (reviewing variations in New Jersey, Nebraska, and Virginia).
62. See Anthony Neddo, Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging the Death Penalty: Opening
the Doors to Arbitrary Decisionmaking in New York Capital Cases, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1949, 1950
(1997) (“[C]harging the death penalty may depend on arbitrary decisionmaking processes
reflective of an individual prosecutor’s moral or ideological position on the death penalty, or on
his or her notion of justice.”).
63. See supra notes 34–38 (detailing the difference between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh).
64. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 374–75 (14th ed. 2007).
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three times as many heinous murders committed in Houston as there
are in Dallas?65
An alternate and more plausible explanation for much of the
variation in some counties is money. While prosecutors regularly
make public statements that they do not consider costs in deciding
whether to seek the death penalty,66 it is unlikely that they are
completely blind to financial concerns.67 Larger counties typically have
larger budgets and can afford to prosecute more capital cases.68 By
contrast, prosecutors69 in smaller counties, or counties facing very
tight budgets, must look beyond the merits of the case to determine
whether they can afford the enormous costs of capital litigation.70
For instance, prosecutors in Shelby County, Texas, which has a
population of less than thirty thousand people,71 recently decided not
to seek the death penalty for a defendant who was accused of three

65. Harris County has sent nearly three times as many defendants to death row as Dallas
County. See TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS, supra note 3 (listing the number of murders
committed in Houston and Dallas).
66. See, e.g., Prosecutor: Death Penalty Hinges on Justice, Not Money, SEATTLE TIMES, June
19, 2000, at B2 (“Spokane County Prosecutor Steve Tucker says money won’t be a factor in his
decision whether to pursue the death penalty against Robert Yates Jr. in eight serial killings.
‘It’s about seeking justice. Money won’t or shouldn’t play into it at all,’ Tucker said last week.”).
67. See Amanda S. Hitchcock, Comment, Using the Adversarial Process to Limit
Arbitrariness in Capital Charging Decisions, 85 N.C. L. REV. 931, 951 (2007) (“Prosecutors
cannot simply ignore these [cost] realities”); see also Berman, supra note 14 (arguing that costs
are a relevant consideration).
68. See Steve Brewer, A Deadly Distinction; County Has Budget to Prosecute with a
Vengeance; District Attorney's Office Focuses on Capital Cases, and Commissioners Court Backs
Up the Approach, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 4, 2001 (quoting a state district judge as saying that
“one of the reasons Harris County tries so many capital murder cases is simple economics – we
can afford to”).
69. In one case, a judge actually forbade prosecutors from seeking the death penalty
because the cost of providing an adequate defense would bankrupt the county which had a
population of less than 13,000 people. Recognizing that such a ruling was impermissible, the
judge quickly reversed course. See Judge Changes Mind on Murder Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2002, § 1, at 22 (discussing the judge’s reversal).
70. Factoring in financial considerations is not limited to capital cases. District attorneys
are forced to take into account financial considerations every day in virtually every facet of their
office policies. For example, as Dan Richman and Bill Stuntz have explained, state prosecutors
rarely pursue high-end white-collar crime because the investigation necessary to win such cases
is too expensive. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 601–02 (2005)
(discussing why only federal district attorneys can afford the high cost of pursuing certain
investigations). It would be surprising if it were any different with respect to capital cases.
71. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION FINDER: SHELBY COUNTY, TEXAS, http://www.
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?geo_id=05000US48419&_state=04000US48&pctxt
=cr (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (listing the population for Shelby County, Texas in 2008 as
26,529).
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separate murders and had already confessed to two of them.72 Shelby
County has sent only one person to death row in the last thirty
years.73 The County’s elected district attorney said that the defendant
deserved the death penalty, but she ultimately agreed to a
punishment of three life sentences because of “limited resources for a
death penalty prosecution.”74
In Pike County, Indiana (population thirteen thousand),75
prosecutors declined to seek the death penalty for three men who
kidnapped a woman and drove over her body up to thirty times while
she was still alive.76 The victim’s mother claimed that the prosecutor
told her the county could not seek the death penalty because it was too
expensive, though the prosecutor denies making this statement.77 A
similar allegation was made in Greene County, Indiana (population
thirty-three thousand),78 where the family of a mentally disabled
woman who was raped, tortured, and murdered79 claimed cost
prohibited the prosecutor from seeking death.80 Once again, the
prosecutor denied considering costs.81 Although it is impossible to say
for certain that the prosecutors from these two small Indiana counties
were lying about not considering costs, it would make logical sense for
them to make that very calculation. Prosecutors from Indiana’s largest
county (Marion County) have estimated that death penalty trials in
that state require the resources of five “normal” murder cases.82
Other prosecutors from across the country have grudgingly
acknowledged that costs play into decisions to seek the death penalty.

72. Matthew Stoff, After Confession, Smith Sentenced to Three Life Terms, DAILY SENTINEL,
Apr. 3, 2008.
73. TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS, supra note 3.
74. Stoff, supra note 72.
75. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: PIKE COUNTY, INDIANA, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/18/18125.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
76. Tim Sparks, Cost of Death Penalty Trial Can Tip Decision, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE,
Oct. 25, 2001, at 1.
77. Id.
78. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: GREENE COUNTY, INDIANA, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/18/18055.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
79. See Suspect Makes Deal To Testify in Slaying, MOBILE REG., Feb. 4, 1999, at Z10.
80. Sparks, supra note 76.
81. Id. In another Indiana case, prosecutors declined to seek the death penalty for a nurse
convicted of killing six patients and suspected in the deaths of dozens of others because of the
costs of seeking the death penalty. See Bill Dedman, Ex-Nurse Sentenced to 360 Years in
Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at A21 (“Prosecutors did not seek the death penalty because
of the higher costs of prosecuting a death penalty case.”).
82. Sparks, supra note 76 (quoting Marion County prosecutor as saying that “the cost of the
death penalty is never a factor in deciding against pursuing a death sentence” even though “a
death penalty trial there demands the resources of five normal murder cases”).
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The District Attorney of Victoria County, Texas (population eighty-six
thousand)83 has stated that “he must consider many factors, including
strategy, time and cost when deciding if he’ll seek the death
penalty.”84 In Hamilton County, Ohio, a Cincinnati prosecutor
defended a plea bargain for a man who opened fire inside a business
and killed two people because it “spared the victims the trauma of a
trial and saved the taxpayers thousands of dollars.”85 In Albuquerque,
New Mexico, a prosecutor declined to seek the death penalty for a man
accused of killing three people primarily because of the strength of the
case.86 Although the prosecutor claimed resources were a secondary
priority, she did acknowledge that seeking death “would take a
minimum of seven people out of the office for eight weeks. And we
have a tremendous caseload, a tremendous demand for our
resources.”87 In Baltimore City, which rarely seeks the death
penalty,88 a veteran prosecutor explained, “I don’t have a moral
problem with the death penalty; I have a resource problem with it.”89
Put simply, prosecutors only have a certain amount of money, and
they must prioritize how to spend it.90
Unfortunately, the importance of money compounds the
arbitrariness problem over time. Counties with the funds to prosecute
large numbers of death penalty cases end up handling many of those
cases and thereby training their lawyers how to litigate them
effectively.91 Thus, county prosecutors with the most death penalty
experience should be more likely to win at trial and should be able to

83. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS: VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48469.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
84. See, e.g., Leslie Wilber, No Death Penalty for 2 Defendants in Slaying, VICTORIA
ADVOCATE, May 8, 2008 (quoting the Victoria County District Attorney as saying that cost is one
factor that must be considered in deciding whether to seek the death penalty).
85. Jessica Brown, West Gets 2 Life Terms, No Parole, CINCINNATI POST, Aug. 24, 2004.
86. Ollie Reed, Jr., DA Decision Not to Retry Harrison Wasn’t Easy, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB.,
Feb. 19, 2001, at A1.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
89. Julie Bykowicz, Death Penalty Has Cost: Circumstances, Resources Guide Baltimore’s
Policy, BALT. SUN, Sept. 3, 2006, at 1A.
90. See infra Part III.A (discussing the cost savings that come from a statewide capital
punishment system). In some states, the state government does step up to the plate to reimburse
counties for some of the high costs of death penalty prosecutions. See infra notes 223–227 and
accompanying text.
91. See Brewer, supra note 68 (quoting veteran Harris County prosecutor Ted Wilson as
saying, “Quite honestly, we just do so damn many more of [capital cases] than anyone else. You
could go into any district attorney’s office in the state and not find as many lawyers with capital
prosecution experience.”).
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maintain a clean record that will survive on appeal.92 By contrast,
counties that rarely seek the death penalty have little institutional
knowledge on how to handle such complicated cases. This relative
inexperience would seemingly lead to increased costs and more losses
at trial. In turn, the monetary and psychological toll may well lead
small counties to hesitate before seeking the death penalty in
situations where a district attorney’s office experienced in death
penalty litigation would have no such hesitation.93
Financial factors also likely affect the viewpoints of lawyers
who spend their entire careers in a single district attorney’s office and
rise to leadership positions. Prosecutors who work for years in offices
that have the resources to seek the death penalty consistently may
come to see aggressive use of the death penalty as appropriate. By
contrast, prosecutors in cash-strapped counties that never saw their
supervisors pursuing capital punishment may be more likely to
believe that this approach is correct.94 Regardless of which approach is
correct, these entrenched views of the death penalty are likely passed
down from one generation of lawyers to the next.95 And these
92. The former proposition—winning at trial—is not controversial, however the latter
proposition—surviving on appeal—is not supported by Professor Liebman’s study of thousands of
death penalty cases. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 340 (finding that the higher the rate a
county imposes death sentences, the higher the reversal rate); see also James S. Liebman, The
Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2048 (2000) (discussing the strong incentives
to overproduce death sentences).
93. This issue has recently arisen in the very expensive “big city” Atlanta prosecution of
Brian Nichols for killing four courthouse employees. A Republican State Senator recently
explained that “the cost of the Nichols case is making prosecutors think twice about whether to
seek the death penalty in future cases.” NPR Morning Edition, Delays Costly In Courthouse
Slaying Suspect's Trial, 2008 WLNR 12936560, July 10, 2008.
94. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecution
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 241 (2003) (“Lawyers in a particular U.S. Attorney's
office generally hail from that district, and thus are nurtured in a particular legal climate unique
to that jurisdiction. What juries and federal prosecutors deem important in a small district that
encompasses rural communities may be quite different from those in a large, urban district. As a
consequence, even if the policies are not expressly recorded, individual offices will have
declination guidelines that arise from custom or practice.”); see also Frank O. Bowman III,
Response, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the Gradual Extinction of the Federal
Criminal Trial Lawyer, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 226, 239 (2007), http://www.
pennumbra.com/responses/11-2007/Bowman.pdf (“[P]rosecutors made cautious by inexperience
and office culture may be especially likely to make risky cases go away, leaving little but ‘slam
dunks’ for trial.”); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 424
(contending that “culture of integrity, as defined by clearly understood and implemented policies
and rules, may be more important in shaping the ethics . . . than hiring the ‘right’ people”
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
95. See, e.g., Tolson, supra note 43 (explaining how the newly elected district attorney in
Harris County, who had worked with his predecessor for nearly two decades, “promises no
change in philosophy on the use of capital punishment”).
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entrenched opinions help to explain why, over long periods of time,
some counties have a stronger culture of seeking the death penalty.
In sum, although most elected prosecutors will not admit it
publicly, money affects use of the death penalty. Wealthy counties can
afford to seek death more often, and doing so may become a selffulfilling prophecy whereby their lawyers are well trained to handle
such cases and see death as appropriate. By contrast, smaller and
poorer counties will pass up the opportunity to seek the ultimate
punishment because they lack the enormous funds necessary to do so.
D. A County-Based System Allows the Problem of Inadequate Lawyers
and Under-Funded Indigent Defense to Fester
The problems with capital punishment are certainly not
limited to the prosecution side. Nearly all capital defendants are too
poor to hire their own lawyers and are therefore provided with free
counsel in the form of a public defender or an appointed lawyer.96
Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions these poor defendants receive
inadequate representation because their lawyers are ineffective or
because otherwise-competent lawyers are woefully underfunded.97
The former problem—utterly incompetent lawyers—receives
the most attention. There are frightening stories about sleeping or
intoxicated lawyers who provide practically no assistance at trial. The
state of North Carolina executed a man in 2001 even though his
lawyer admitted to drinking twelve shots of rum every day during the
penalty phase of the trial.98 The lawyer failed to present the jury with
evidence that the defendant’s alcoholic parents had given him away
when he was four years old, he had started using cocaine before his
teenage years, and he had been shuffled to six different families before
dropping out of high school.99 Around the time of trial, the lawyer was
in a midday car accident and found to have a near-lethal blood-alcohol
level of 0.44.100
Then there are the lawyers appointed to capital cases despite
being sanctioned for prior misconduct. A Tennessee study found that
eleven lawyers remained eligible to take death penalty cases despite
having been disciplined by the Bar “for unethical or illegal

96. See Robert Weisberg, Who Defends Capital Defendants?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 535,
535 (1995) (“The State virtually always pays for the defense of those whom it seeks to execute.”).
97. Bright, supra note 18, at 1844.
98. Jeffrey Gettleman, Execution Ends Debatable Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at A1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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activities.”101 A similar inquiry in North Carolina determined that one
in six defendants sentenced to death were represented by lawyers who
had been disciplined by the North Carolina State Bar.102
Legendary stories also exist of unqualified political cronies
being appointed to handle cases as payback for contributing to judges’
campaigns.103 Until the mid-1990s this was common in Harris County,
Texas, the so-called capital of capital punishment. The infamous Joe
Cannon was regularly appointed to capital cases even though he was
widely known for falling asleep during trial.104 Other unqualified
lawyers also received appointments because “courthouse appointment
lists were often an informal string of each judge’s friends and
campaign contributors.”105
Finally, there are cases of non-criminal lawyers with little or
no litigation experience handling capital cases. In Illinois, a judge
appointed a tax lawyer who had never tried a case before to represent
a defendant facing the death penalty.106 Another Illinois judge
appointed a real estate and probate lawyer who, when asked whether
he had ever handled a criminal jury trial by himself, replied, “Well, is
paternity criminal?”107 In Texas, a wrongfully convicted man spent
years on death row after also being represented by a real estate
lawyer at trial.108
101. John Shiffman, Troubled Lawyers Still Allowed to Work Death Cases, TENNESSEAN, July
25, 2001, at A1.
102. Ronald J. Tabak, Why an Independent Appointing Authority Is Necessary to Choose
Counsel for Indigent People in Capital Punishment Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2003)
(citing COMMON SENSE FOUND., LIFE AND DEATH LOTTERY (2002), http://www.common-sense.org
/?fnoc=./consider_this/consider_this_021015).
103. See id. at 1113–14 (recounting cronyism between a Texas judge and his “buddy,” who
was “incompetent to handle capital cases”).
104. See Flood, supra note 43, at A1 (stating that “the late state District Judge George
Walker, occasionally known for taking a nap on the bench, frequently appointed his good friend,
the late Joe Cannon, who slept through parts of a capital murder trial”); see also Paul M. Barrett,
On the Defense: Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About System, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 7, 1994, at A1 (quoting a sworn affidavit of Cannon’s co-counsel that Cannon slept through
“significant periods [of the jury selection] on numerous occasions”).
105. Flood, supra note 43, at A1.
106. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Defenses Cloud Verdicts: With Their Lives at Stake,
Defendants in Illinois Capital Trials Need the Best Attorneys Available. But They Often Get Some
of the Worst, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1999, at 1.
107. Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 959 (2004) (quoting
People v. Rissley, No. 82536, 2001 Ill. LEXIS 241, at *40 (Ill. Mar. 15, 2001) (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting), aff’d, 795 N.E.2d 174 (Ill. 2003)).
108. See Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full
Habeas Corpus Review By Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting
Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (2000) (explaining that although Randall Dale
Adams was sentenced to death at trial, he was later exonerated). The unfortunate story of
Randall Dale Adams was made famous in the documentary THE THIN BLUE LINE (MGM 1988).
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Just as troubling as the anecdotal stories of bad lawyering is
the pervasive funding problem for indigent defense throughout the
nation. In many jurisdictions, highly competent appointed lawyers are
unable to provide adequate defenses because they lack the funding to
handle the cases effectively. As Stephen Bright has explained, even
though public defender offices “attract some of the most dedicated and
conscientious young lawyers, those lawyers find it exhausting and
enormously difficult to provide adequate representation when saddled
with huge caseloads and lacking the necessary investigative
assistance.”109 Not only do these lawyers lack the money to hire
investigators, some must also subsist with insufficient basic
necessities such as office equipment, technology, adequate support
staff, and expert witness funding.110 Of course, prosecutors’ offices are
not flush with cash, but they still possess considerably greater assets
than many of the defense lawyers representing indigent defendants.
An analysis of Harris County, Texas found that the district attorney’s
entire office budget was $26 million in 1999, compared with $11.6
million for “attorneys for indigent clients in county and district
court.”111
Writing more than a decade ago, Professor Douglas Vick
observed that “[i]n most death penalty states, indigent defense is
funded at the county level, where it ‘compete[s] as a very low priority
among a multitude of other governmental services.’ ”112 And while a
handful of states have moved toward providing more state funding for
indigent defense generally,113 many of the nation’s counties continue

109. Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services
to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 816.
110. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 10 (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.
111. Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County Courts; Those Using Appointed
Lawyers Are Twice as Likely to Serve Time, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 17, 1999, at A1. In 1992 and
1996, one report found that roughly 80 percent of defendants charged with felonies in seventyfive of the nation’s most populous counties—of which Harris County is one—utilized public
defenders or assigned counsel. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2001), available at http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=772.
112. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 394 (1995) (quoting Jonathan E. Gradess, The
Road From Scottsboro: We’re Not as Far Along as We Think, 2 CRIM. JUST., Summer 1987, at 2,
4).
113. See Mary Sue Bachus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1103–16 (2006) (describing legislation providing for
additional funding in Texas, Georgia, Virginia, Washington, and Montana).
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to lack sufficient funds to provide an adequate defense for capital and
non-capital defendants.114
In sum, county funding of indigent defense is considered by
many to be a failure.115 In all too many jurisdictions, defendants end
up with attorneys who are either incompetent or simply lack the
resources to provide an adequate defense.
E. Poor Judges Fail to Stop Misconduct and Allow
Reversible Error to Occur
When scholars analyze the actors in the death penalty system,
they focus primarily on prosecutors and defense lawyers.116 Little
attention is paid to the judges who preside over death penalty cases.
Perhaps the lack of attention is due to the obvious nature of the
problem: some judges are simply better than others at running a fair
trial that is unlikely to be reversed on appeal. This problem exists in
every area of the legal system; some bankruptcy judges understand
the code better than others, just as some family court judges are wiser
than their colleagues. The situation is no different in death penalty
cases. Some judges are truly excellent while others, unfortunately, are
not as knowledgeable about the law or strong enough to reign in
aggressive lawyers.
The disparity in the quality of judges is arguably more
important in capital cases than in other areas of law—after all, a
person’s life is on the line. If we take to heart the Supreme Court’s

114. See Eric M. Freedman, Add Resources and Apply Them Systematically: Governments’
Responsibilities Under the Revised ABA Capital Defense Representation Guidelines, 31 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1097, 1100–01 (2003) (“[T]he states simply refuse to allocate sufficient funds to provide
competent capital defense representation. But that does not make the costs disappear. It just
shifts them.”).
115. The commentary to Guideline 2.1 of the American Bar Association Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases recognizes that defender
organizations should be statewide so as to avoid political pressure and improve funding. ABA
GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES Guideline 2.1, cmt. at 20 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf
(“Jurisdictionwide organization and funding can best ameliorate local disparities in resources and quality of
representation, and insulate the administration of defense services from local political
pressures.’”); see also Catherine Greene Burnett, Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital
Counsel: The Dilemma of Enforcement, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 165, 196 (2007) (suggesting the
“radical” change that Texas create a “unified, statewide capital defense office”).
116. The excellent work of the Capital Jury Project has also focused on jurors. See, e.g.,
SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY (2005)
(explaining the decision-making process of jurors); William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project:
Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995) (same).
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assertion that “death is different,”117 then the deprivation of life, as
opposed to liberty or property, is the most serious government action
imaginable.118 It stands to reason that we should have the best
possible judges presiding over such trials.
Pragmatic concerns also counsel that high-quality judges are
more important in capital cases. Death penalty law is very
complicated, and the Supreme Court is continually “tinker[ing] with
the machinery of death.”119 And even when the Court is not changing
the law, it has a “troublesome affinity for obsessing over capital cases”
by getting into the factual details of individual cases in a way unseen
in other areas of law.120 It therefore is not surprising that Professor
James Liebman’s enormous study of capital cases from 1973 to 1995
reveals that 68 percent of capital cases were reversed on appeal by
federal or state appeals courts.121 While many of the most common
reversible errors—such as failing to disclose favorable evidence and
ineffective assistance of counsel—are outside the hands of judges,122
some errors are not. Some capital cases are reversed because judges
reject defense lawyers’ challenges to questionable peremptory
challenges made by prosecutors.123 Others are reversed because judges
give incorrect jury instructions124 or fail to shut down lawyers making

117. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”).
118. I have previously made this argument in the context of post-trial proportionality review.
See Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence:
Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages
Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1288–91 (2000) (arguing that the right to life is more important
than the right to liberty and the right to property).
119. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating
that he would no longer “tinker with the machinery of death”)
120. Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time: Examining the Supreme Court’s “Culture
of Death,” 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861, 861, 875 (2008) (acknowledging that Supreme Court
Justices and their clerks are “institutionally inclined to give particular careful, cautious, and
conscientious attention to every claim of death penalty error raised by capital defendants” due to
the “practical problems with the administration of the death penalty”).
121. LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at i.
122. But see Liebman, supra note 92, at 2111–12 (2000) (arguing that judges could demand
that more evidence be produced or refuse to appoint ineffective lawyers but decline to do so out of
self-interest in being reelected).
123. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 265–66 (2005) (vacating conviction and
death sentence because prosecutors used peremptory challenges to strike ten of eleven black
prospective jurors without offering sufficient race-neutral reasons).
124. See James S. Liebman, Jeff Fagan & Valerie West, Technical Errors Can Kill, NAT’L
L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/643 (listing faulty jury
instructions as a significant error leading to reversal in capital cases).
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prejudicial arguments.125 Still other cases are reversed because
defendants are not permitted to present relevant mitigating
evidence.126 Even if such errors cause only a small number of
reversals, they are nevertheless avoidable errors. And given the
enormous time, expense, and emotional turmoil involved in capital
cases, anything that can reduce reversals should be explored.
An excellent judge is likely to minimize reversible error in at
least two ways. First, a judge who is well versed in the law is less
likely to make erroneous rulings that would provide a basis for
reversal on appeal.127 Second, a well-respected judge will deter the
parties from “pushing the envelope” at trial. With a firm, tough judge
in the driver’s seat, prosecutors seemingly would be less likely to try to
eliminate prospective jurors based on race or make aggressive
arguments that step over the line.
Unfortunately, the current death penalty system does little to
push aside less qualified judges. In most counties, capital cases are
randomly assigned, just like other criminal matters. Some death
penalty cases end up in the hands of good judges, while others do not.
The skill of judges in capital trials, however, need not be left to
chance. As the next Part demonstrates, it is possible to create a
statewide capital punishment system that is staffed by elite
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges.
II. DESIGNING A STATEWIDE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM
As discussed in Part I, there are serious problems with the
prosecution, defense, and judging of county-based death penalty cases.
That does not mean that there are not prosecutors who make good
charging decisions, appointed lawyers who vigorously defend cases,
and judges who run a tight and fair ship. Too often, such high-quality
125. See Welsh White, Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct in Capital Cases: Imposing
Prohibitions on Improper Penalty Trial Arguments, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1147, 1154–56 (2002)
(discussing improper arguments, including reference to religious or biblical writings).
126. See, e.g., Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 1999) (ordering new
sentencing hearing, inter alia, because the defendant was not permitted to introduce polygraph
evidence explaining why previous criminal charges against him had been dismissed).
127. Let me be clear that I am looking for the most learned judges, not necessarily jurists
who have simply spent a lot of time on the bench. As Professor David Schwartz recently found
with respect to patent cases, there is no evidence that “district judges’ reversal rates decrease as
they handle more patent cases.” David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study
of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 256 (2008).
Assuming Professor Schwartz’s findings would be transferable to other areas of law, that does
not mean an elite group of death penalty judges cannot help reduce the number of reversals. His
findings do seem to indicate, however, that we must choose judges carefully and not simply rely
on longevity as our primary criterion.

1b. Gershowitz_ Page (Do Not Delete)

2010]

STATEWIDE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

3/18/2010 7:08 PM

329

lawyering goes unrecognized by academics and abolitionists who
criticize the death penalty generally. The problem with capital
punishment in the United States is not that excellent death penalty
lawyers do not exist. The problem is that the excellent lawyers are not
asked to handle all of their states’ capital cases.
Because capital cases are the most serious, we should call on
the best prosecutors and defense lawyers from around the state to
handle all of the state’s capital cases, not just the cases from their
home counties. In this Part, I argue that the state’s best prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and judges should work on a statewide, rather than a
county-wide, basis and handle all of the state’s death penalty cases.128
A. An Anecdotal Example of a Fair Fight: Bringing in Top-Notch
Lawyers from Outside the County Line
During her twenty-one years as a Harris County prosecutor,
Kelly Siegler became a famed trial lawyer and personally handled
nineteen death penalty trials, eighteen of which resulted in a death
sentence.129 Siegler was so skilled in the courtroom that Twentieth

128. The State of Illinois has implemented a system that moves in this direction but does not
go far enough. Following the large number of exonerations in Illinois in the 1990s, the Illinois
Supreme Court established the Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases. Barbara J.
Hayler, Moratorium and Reform: Illinois’s Efforts to Make the Death Penalty Process “Fair, Just,
and Accurate,” 29 JUST. SYS. J. 423, 424 (2008). The Committee recommended that “[l]ead
counsel would be required to have at least five years of criminal litigation experience; to have
tried at least eight felony trials, including two murder cases; and to have specialized capital-case
training or experience.” Id. at 425. Unfortunately, the Illinois approach still allows too many
lawyers to be involved in capital cases, rather than relying on an elite unit. As one observer
noted, by the end of 2004, the Illinois Capital Litigation Trial Bar had 714 lawyers certified to
handle capital cases. See Judge Michael P. Toomin, Capital Punishment Reform and the Illinois
Supreme Court: At the Forefront of Change, 92 ILL. B.J. 642, 644 (2004) (“As of October 15, 2005,
714 attorneys statewide have been certified as members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar . . .
.”). As I explain below, the number of death penalty lawyers should be much smaller in order to
promote consistency and to ensure that quality representation is always provided. See discussion
infra Part II.B.2 (advocating selection of the best defense lawyers to represent defendants
charged with capital offenses). The Chair of the Illinois General Assembly Capital Punishment
Reform Committee appears to agree, as he recently lamented that “the capital punishment
system in Illinois lacks any overall, statewide system in place to assure consistency in capital
certifications or to protect against . . . racial and geographic bias.” Thomas P. Sullivan, Efforts to
Improve the Illinois Capital Punishment System: Worth the Cost?, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 935, 966
(2007); see also Robert S. Burke, The Illinois Death Penalty Defense System and the ABA Capital
Defense Guidelines, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 348, 353–54 (2008) (reviewing the Illinois approach to
appointing defense lawyers in capital cases and explaining that there is minimal monitoring of
lawyers or corrective action for inadequate performance).
129. The Law Offices of Kelly Siegler, Bio, http://www.kellysieglerlaw.com/bio.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2010).
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Century Fox ordered a television pilot based on her career.130 In 2008,
after losing her bid to become the elected Harris County District
Attorney, Siegler quietly resigned her position as an assistant district
attorney.131 She declined numerous lucrative offers to work in private
practice,132 and instead she accepted a post-election position as a
special assistant prosecutor in Wharton County, Texas, to work on a
single case: the capital prosecution of James Garrett Freeman.133
Wharton County has a population of just over forty thousand
people.134 And despite being only sixty miles from Harris County,
which had 119 inmates awaiting execution on death row as of the
summer of 2008,135 Wharton County had not prosecuted a death
penalty case in over thirty years.136 The County chose to seek the
death penalty against Freeman after he engaged in a shootout with
game warden officers and killed an officer in cold blood.137
Notably, Siegler was in for a tough fight because Freeman was
represented by Stanley Schneider, one of Houston’s most recognized
and effective criminal defense lawyers.138 Schneider had been honored
by the State Bar of Texas as the Outstanding Criminal Defense
Lawyer of the Year139 and had three decades of experience in capital
130. See Brian Rogers, Defense Attorney Dick DeGuerin is Methodical, Prosecutor Kelly
Siegler Is Theatrical: In the Temple Murder Trial, Expect Fireworks, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 20,
2007, at A1 (“In 2005, 20th Century Fox TV shot a television pilot based on Siegler’s life.”).
131. Peggy O’Hare, Siegler Resigns From DA’s Office, She Will Try Capital Murder Case in
Wharton County Later This Year, HOUSTON CHRON., May 10, 2008, at B1.
132. See id. (pointing out that Siegler accepted the Wharton County position despite having
“between five and 10” job offers from civil law firms and other district attorneys’ offices).
133. See id. (“Siegler is looking forward to working as a special prosecutor, trying a capital
murder case in Wharton County this fall.”).
134. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS: WHARTON COUNTY, TEXAS,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48481.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
135. Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUSTON L.
REV. 807, 838 (2008).
136. See Peggy O’Hare, Game Warden Slaying: Wharton Residents Assemble for Trial: Death
Penalty Case Is the First in This Small Town in Three Decades, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 9, 2008,
at B1 (stating that Freeman’s trial is the first death penalty trial to occur in Wharton since the
1970s).
137. See Peggy O’Hare, Murder Trial in Death of Warden Begins: Death Penalty Case is the
First in Decades in Wharton County, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 20, 2008, at B1 (“I believe that
someone who kills a cop is just a little more culpable than, say, some thug who, in the heat of an
armed robbery, kills someone.”); see also Brandon L. Leonard, 600 Summoned for Capital
Murder Case, VICTORIA ADVOC., Sept. 9, 2008, at 1 (“He is charged with capital murder in the
shooting death of game warden Justin Hurst, 34.”).
138. See Brian Rogers, Former Harris Prosecutor to Testify About Confession, HOUSTON
CHRON., Sept. 20, 2008 (describing Schneider as a “a prominent defense attorney”).
139. Rose Nisker, The Crusaders of Death Row, TEXAS SUPER LAWYERS, Oct. 2009, available
at http://www.superlawyers.com/texas/article/The-Crusaders-of-Death-Row/aa6f34b2-8696-4974840b-4015ca4bed47.html.
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cases.140 Although he was based out of Houston, Schneider accepted
the case. Ultimately, Freeman was convicted and sentenced to
death.141 And while appeals will certainly continue for years, there is
little chance that a plausible ineffective assistance of counsel claim
could be leveled against Schneider.
Regardless of whether one thinks Freeman was the “worst of
the worst” and deserving of death, his case is notable for the quality of
the attorneys on both sides. Even more noteworthy is that both the
prosecutor and defense lawyer were brought in from outside the
county line to handle the case.
The question, then, is whether the Freeman case can be used
as a model to move from a county-based death penalty system to a
statewide approach. As I explain in Part II.B below, it is plausible to
create a functioning statewide capital punishment system, even in
very large states that have long relied on a county-based death
penalty model.
B. Transitioning to a Statewide Capital Punishment System Staffed by
Elite Prosecutors, Defense Lawyers, and Judges
In a world of perfect information, it would be easy to transition
to a statewide system because everyone would know that Pam
Prosecutor from Los Angeles and Dan Defense Attorney from San
Francisco are the best in the business. In reality, however, most
lawyers have little knowledge about their peers in other counties.
Moreover, attorney skill is highly subjective. It would therefore be
very difficult to select a statewide team by relying solely on word of
mouth. A more plausible approach would be to begin primarily with
“paper” qualifications to select the first group of lawyers and then to
allow those lawyers to give significant input in selecting the next wave
of attorneys. Let us begin with selecting the prosecutors.
1. Selecting the Best Prosecutors by Relying on Quantitative and
Qualitative Information
At the outset, participation in an elite statewide capital
prosecution unit should require considerable experience. Thus, to
140. See Rosanna Ruiz & Mike Tolson, Capital Punishment on Decline in County, HOUSTON
CHRON., July 25, 2007, at A1 (stating that Schneider “has been involved in death penalty cases
for three decades”).
141. Sonny Long, Unanimous Death Sentence: Wharton County Jury Gives Game Warden’s
Killer the Ultimate Penalty, VICTORIA ADVOC., Nov. 8, 2008, at A1.
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serve as an elite capital prosecutor, state legislatures should require
that a lawyer possess such experience. For example, they should
require at least ten years of experience in handling felony cases and
serving as counsel of record in at least five death penalty cases. Of
course, because it would be impossible for future generations of
lawyers to gain death penalty experience if they were not already in
the capital case unit, this requirement would have to be modified after
the first round of capital prosecutors.142
Another obvious criterion is ethics. The legislature should
eliminate any prosecutor who has been the subject of a successful
ethics complaint filed with the bar.143 More importantly, any lawyer
who has had at least one case (capital or otherwise) reversed for
prosecutorial misconduct should be excluded. While “misconduct”
could be defined in many ways, the legislature should be most
concerned with the serious types of misconduct that lead to reversal of
criminal convictions: suppressing favorable evidence, striking
prospective jurors based on race, and presenting improper arguments
to the jury.144
Regarding general appellate records, prosecutors should not be
disqualified from service because they have a less-than-perfect record
on appeal in their capital cases. As Professor James Liebman and his
colleagues have demonstrated, thousands of capital cases have been
reversed on appeal over the last few decades, often for reasons beyond
the control of prosecutors, such as erroneous jury instructions or
ineffective assistance of defense counsel.145 Still, an elite statewide
capital punishment unit should be staffed with prosecutors who know
how to select and try cases with an eye toward avoiding reversal. In
order to help narrow down the list of eligible prosecutors, the
legislature should impose a bright-line rule eliminating prosecutors
142. Additionally, if a state had recently enacted the death penalty or has rarely sought it in
previous years, no prosecutor would have experience in five or more cases. For these states, the
experience requirement would have to be modified.
143. By “successful,” I mean a complaint resulting in a finding that the prosecutor has
engaged in misconduct. This will likely not be much of a qualifier because successful ethics
complaints are rare even against misbehaving prosecutors. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697
(1987) (claiming that despite universal adoption by the states of disciplinary rules, and despite
numerous reported cases showing violations of these rules, “disciplinary charges have been
brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions rarely applied”).
144. Unfortunately, there are dozens of capital cases that have been reversed for these types
of misconduct. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1075–84 (2009) (discussing some of the
twenty-six Brady violations and fifteen Batson violations that led to reversals of capital
convictions between 1997 and 2007).
145. LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 8.
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whose capital cases have been reversed more than, for example, 25
percent of the time.146
These quantitative (or “paper”) requirements would
significantly narrow the list of eligible prosecutors, but they probably
would not be enough to select a final group. Thus, more qualitative,
reputational criteria should also be employed. The initial list should
be narrowed and the final candidates selected based on input from
lawyers who have practiced with them. Because the prosecutors are a
statewide unit, the state attorney general should be responsible for
gathering input and making the final decision. Thus, the enabling
statute should instruct the attorney general to survey prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and judges who have worked with each finalist, just
as local bar associations survey lawyers to ascertain their views on
judicial candidates.147 If a majority of defense lawyers or judges rates
a candidate as “unqualified,” then the attorney general should be
forced to strike that candidate from the list.148
Finally, the legislation should instruct the attorney general to
achieve geographic diversity in selecting prosecutors. Unless the
attorney general specifies in writing that there are no viable
candidates, she should be required to select at least one prosecutor
from each of the state’s federal districts.149 Moreover, to ensure that
the views of smaller counties are represented, the attorney general
should also be required to select at least one prosecutor from a county
with a population of less than two hundred and fifty thousand people.
Ideally, the attorney general would choose prosecutors who are
respected not only by fellow prosecutors, but also by the defense
lawyers and judges with whom they have worked for many years.150

146. A 75 percent success rate would actually be quite impressive. See id. (finding a 68
percent reversal rate for capital cases between 1973 and 1995).
147. For a discussion of one state’s approach to surveying opinions of judicial candidates, see
A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical Effects, and
Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 655–61 (1998).
148. This rule should operate reciprocally when selecting statewide defense lawyers. If a
majority of prosecutors or judges rates a defense lawyer as unqualified, she should be eliminated
from consideration.
149. In smaller states, of course, there will be only one federal district from which to choose.
150. Of course, it is possible that the Attorney General will select candidates who mirror his
ideological view of the death penalty, rather than choosing solely based on qualifications. See
Jonathan DeMay, A District Attorney’s Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penalty: Toward an
Improved Process, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767, 771, 802 (1999) (arguing for a committee, rather
than a single district attorney, to determine who should face the death penalty, but recognizing
that “[t]he composition of the death penalty committee is likely to reflect the views espoused by
the individuals who select members”). This problem is tempered by the fact that the Attorney
General can only select prosecutors who have already met the seniority, experience, ethics, and
low reversal qualifications.
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However, even if the attorney general does not have the purest of
motives, the “paper” qualifications would limit her discretion and
ensure that an experienced, qualified, and diverse group of
prosecutors from across the state is selected as the first group of
statewide capital prosecutors.
If the legislature were to follow this suggested approach, it
would eventually lead to a new problem. Once the transition to a
statewide death penalty system is complete and all death penalty
cases are handled by the new unit, local prosecutors will no longer be
able to acquire any capital trial experience. Thus, once prosecutors
from the statewide capital unit retire, there would be no one with
enough capital experience to be eligible to replace them. Accordingly,
the requirement that statewide prosecutors have handled five death
penalty cases should only apply to the initial group of prosecutors who
are selected for the elite unit.
Once those elite prosecutors are in place, they should begin
interviewing experienced prosecutors to join the capital unit as junior
capital prosecutors. These prosecutors would still need to have
sterling records—at least ten years of felony experience, no ethical
violations, and no reversals for prosecutorial misconduct—but they
need not have extensive death penalty experience. The original elite
team of statewide prosecutors, with their years of capital experience,
would be in a good position to select their junior subordinates from
around the state.151 And the original elite team of experienced capital
prosecutors should be well suited to mentoring and evaluating their
junior colleagues. Because the junior prosecutors would be working
exclusively on capital cases once they join the statewide unit, the
senior prosecutors would have an uninterrupted opportunity to
observe their talents and weaknesses. If they do well, the junior
prosecutors would eventually be promoted when the original members
of the elite capital team retire or return to their home jurisdictions.
With multiple years of exclusively death penalty cases under their
belts, the formerly junior prosecutors would be ready to take over
primary responsibility for their state’s capital cases—and to select
hard-working, smart, ethical prosecutors to take over the junior
positions.

151. As with the initial group of prosecutors, junior prosecutors should come from each of the
state’s federal districts and at least one should come from a county with a population of less than
250,000 people.
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2. Selecting the Best Defense Attorneys
Once the prosecutors are selected, the next and equally
important task is to select the very best defense attorneys. The
qualifications for defense attorneys should be similar to those for
prosecutors. The original group of statewide defense attorneys should
have extensive and unblemished resumes: for instance, at least ten
years of felony experience, no ethical violations, no successful
ineffective assistance of counsel challenges, and a minimum of five
death penalty cases.152
As with the selection of prosecutors, once these initial “paper”
qualifications are satisfied, the attorney general’s office should survey
lawyers and judges from each candidate’s jurisdiction. Any candidate
with a majority of “unqualified” votes should be disqualified.
Thereafter, the attorney general should select among the remaining
candidates. Because defense lawyers are not responsible for capital
charging, ensuring representation from around the state and from
small counties is not essential; although defense lawyers’ life
experiences may differ depending on whether they are from a smaller
county or a large city, those different experiences will not affect the
prosecutors’ charging decisions. Accordingly, geographic diversity in
selecting defense lawyers should be aspirational, though not required.
In selecting statewide capital defense lawyers, the single most
important factor will be attorney skill.
As with the elite prosecutors, the process must be slightly
modified for the second generation of elite capital defense attorneys.
Once the first wave of elite defense attorneys has been selected and
begins handling all of the state’s capital cases, up-and-coming local
defense attorneys (like their prosecutor counterparts) will be unable to
acquire death penalty experience. Thus, the first generation of elite
defense attorneys should be called upon to interview and hire junior
lawyers. The junior lawyers should be required to fulfill all of the
three “paper” qualifications that do not require specific death penalty
experience: at least ten years of felony experience, no ethical
violations, and no successful ineffective assistance of counsel
challenges. As with prosecutors, the junior defense lawyers would
152. Unfortunately, the ineffectiveness criterion does not serve as much of a limitation
because, while ineffective assistance challenges are often filed, they are rarely successful. See,
e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (discussing the infrequency with which courts
reverse convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel and arguing for prospective means
of improving assistance of counsel).
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learn the ropes by working exclusively on capital cases and would
eventually move up the ladder to replace their senior colleagues.
An important question is how this system should handle the
less-common case in which a defendant wishes to retain a private
lawyer, rather than accept state-funded indigent defense counsel. The
best practice would be for private lawyers to be permitted to
supplement—but not supplant—the elite lawyers from the capital
defense unit. In Illinois, which has recently established elaborate
rules to ensure quality defense counsel, defense lawyers must be
members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar in order to be appointed
to represent an indigent capital defendant.153 If a defendant can afford
to retain a private lawyer who is not on the list, he is free to do so, but
that lawyer must take a backseat to the two lead lawyers who are
members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar.154
The Illinois approach is sound. When jurisdictions across the
country have taken steps to impose standards and to provide adequate
funding, the quality of representation has vastly improved155 to the
point where appointed lawyers are often better than retained
counsel.156 Thus, while a retained lawyer might do a first-rate job in a
capital case, it is possible that a lawyer who only occasionally handles
capital cases will do a poor job.157 And because a statewide system is
designed to equalize justice and eliminate post-trial claims such as
ineffective assistance of counsel, it would be counterproductive to open
up that possibility by allowing retained lawyers to replace the elite,
state-funded defense lawyers.

153. See supra note 128 (discussing capital punishment reform in Illinois).
154. See Hayler, supra note 128, at 435 (discussing reforms to the Illinois death penalty
system).
155. For instance, all observers appear to believe that indigent defense in Texas has
improved substantially since the enactment of the Texas Fair Defense Act in 2001. See Kyung M.
Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent Defendants, and the Right
to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 386 (2004) (“As reformers in Texas have been diligently
working to change the system since 2001, the results so far have been promising, including some
improvements in attorney selection procedures and attorney qualification requirements.”).
156. In Harris County, Texas, where the author resides, there is anecdotal (though no
empirical) evidence to support this proposition. Cf. George C. Thomas, III, When Lawyers Fail
Innocent Defendants: Exorcising the Ghosts that Haunt the Criminal Justice Systems, 2008 UTAH
L. REV. 25, 43 (“During my small-town law practice, the representation of criminal defendants by
appointed counsel, that sometimes included me, was competent if not stellar.”).
157. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1980) (recognizing that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims can be made against privately retained lawyers).
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3. Selecting a Pool of Exceptional Judges
Judges should also be selected from a pool of candidates who
have the requisite tangible qualifications. For the initial group of
judges, the legislature should limit death penalty cases to judges who
have been on the bench hearing felony cases for at least ten years.
These judges also should have no disciplinary infractions and should
have received high marks on judicial qualification questionnaires
conducted by the local bar.
More importantly, however, the judges selected should have
low reversal rates in capital and non-capital cases. At present, the
nationwide reversal rates in capital cases are dramatically higher
than in non-capital cases.158 While low reversal rates are not always a
proxy for the best judges,159 the fact remains that the current death
penalty system could benefit greatly from judges who run trials so as
to avoid reversible error. As such, the initial qualification to be
selected as an elite capital judge should be a below-average reversal
rate in both capital and non-capital cases. Along with the requirement
of ten years of felony experience, this requirement should narrow the
list to a much smaller pool of eligible candidates.160
Once a pool of eligible judges is in place, the prosecutors and
defense lawyers should have the authority to select a particular judge
for each trial. Just like the process for selecting an arbitrator in some
states,161 the prosecutors and defense lawyers should be permitted an

158. Scholars estimate the reversal rate for ordinary criminal cases to be between 10 and 20
percent, which is obviously far below the capital reversal rate. See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the
Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 516 (1992) (reviewing
California cases and estimating that “approximately one criminal conviction in five was modified
by the appellate process”); Liebman, supra note 92, at 2053 n.90 (estimating that non-capital
reversal rate is “probably far less than ten percent”).
159. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 401–04 (2007)
(challenging conventional wisdom that judges fear reversal and arguing that higher reversal
rates do not necessarily inhibit promotion to higher judicial positions).
160. The Illinois Supreme Court has issued a rule requiring all judges presiding over capital
cases to attend a capital litigation training seminar at least once every two years. See ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 43. This has resulted in hundreds of judges attending death penalty seminars. Toomin,
supra note 128, at 644. According to the Chair of the Illinois General Assembly’s Capital
Punishment Reform Committee, the training, along with other reform efforts, has established a
situation in which “judges now assigned to try capital cases have the requisite knowledge and
experience.” Sullivan, supra note 128, at 957. Once again, I believe this is a step in the right
direction but it does not go far enough. Rather than training a large number of judges and
hoping they do a good job, it would be preferable to put all of a state’s capital cases in the hands
of a much smaller number of elite trial judges who can be trained more thoroughly and carefully
monitored.
161. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES M-4(b) (Am.
Arbitration Ass’n), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440%20 (“If the parties are
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equal number of strikes to eliminate judges whom they find
unacceptable. The last remaining judge should preside over the trial.
In early cases, lawyers who have not appeared before a
particular judge may find it hard to assess how favorable that judge
will be toward the prosecution or defense. However, both prosecutors
and defense lawyers can turn initially to statewide professional
organizations—for instance, the District and County Attorneys’
Association, or the local chapter of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers—to seek information about judges they do
not know. And after the lawyers have a few cases under their belts,
they will quickly form their own opinions as to which judges are the
most capable and fair. While prosecutors might prefer Judge X, and
defense lawyers might prefer Judge Y, each side’s ability to strike
judges would eliminate the outliers and leave a small group of judges
to handle the vast majority of capital cases.
Having a very small pool of mutually acceptable judges would
have enormous benefits. The judges would get to know the prosecutors
and defense lawyers who would appear frequently in front of them. By
knowing each other, the lawyers and judges would hopefully work well
together. This would move cases along briskly and reduce the time of
trials, thus saving money. Perhaps more importantly, the judges
would learn the strengths and weaknesses of individual lawyers. From
repeated interaction, judges may come to recognize that a particular
prosecutor is an aggressive questioner who pushes the boundaries of
what is permissible. Judges would therefore know when to be on
guard for prosecutors exceeding their bounds and thus cut off any
prospect of reversible error before it occurs.
In sum, the role of judges in capital cases is too important to be
left to the whims of random assignment. Because it is plausible to
separate the good judges from the bad, at least in terms of relative
reversal rates, states should take steps to ensure that capital cases
are staffed by the most competent judges who are least likely to be
reversed.
4. Adopting a Committee Approach to Capital Charging
Once the key players are in place, the next logistical challenge
is to determine which cases become death penalty cases and which are
returned to local prosecutors to be tried as “ordinary” murder
prosecutions. Having created an elite statewide group of prosecutors,
unable to agree upon a mediator, each party shall strike unacceptable names from the list,
number the remaining names in order of preference, and return the list to the AAA.”).
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the most effective approach would then be to utilize a committee made
up of those prosecutors to make charging decisions. Many prosecutors’
offices already have advisory committees to recommend whether the
district attorney should seek the death penalty.162 I would go further
and turn over the entire charging decision to the committee.163 As
explained below, junior prosecutors should prepare the cases, and
senior prosecutors should vote on whether to seek the death penalty.
After local prosecutors decide that a defendant will face murder
charges, they should be statutorily obligated to refer the case to the
elite capital punishment unit.164 That elite unit must then decide, for

162. The most prominent is the Department of Justice’s Capital Case Review Committee,
which advises the U.S. Attorney General. See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History
and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 407–40
(1999) (detailing the Department of Justice’s process for deciding how to prosecute potentially
capital cases). For a discussion of U.S. Attorneys turning to a voluntary committee before
referring the case to the Justice Department, see Benjamin Weiser, Pondering Death, by
Committee: What Is a Capital Crime? Federal Panel Decides Case by Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
1997, at B1.
163. Other observers have advocated that capital charging be done by committees rather
than individual prosecutors. The most detailed proposals are DeMay, supra note 150, at 811–18
(proposing two solutions: (1) that a committee of experienced and ideologically diverse
prosecutors review all potentially capital cases in order to make a non-binding recommendation
on whether to seek the death penalty; and (2) a statewide committee made up of prosecutors
from across the state that will make binding determinations on whether to seek death) and
Horowitz, supra note 28, at 2573, 2600–02 (arguing for a committee appointed by the governor
and the local district attorney to eliminate conflicts between state and local officials in
jurisdictions that allow for supersedure). For other proposals, see Anna-Liisa Joseloff,
Connecticut’s Capital Punishment Scheme: Still Tinkering With the Machinery of Death, 23
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 889, 924 (2004) (advocating that a committee of the state’s attorneys be
statutorily empowered to determine whether to seek the death penalty); McCarthy, supra note
61, at 995 (suggesting that the state attorney general review every death eligible case); Paul
Schoeman, Note, Easing the Fear of Too Much Justice: A Compromise Proposal to Revise the
Racial Justice Act, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 543, 573 (1995) (suggesting an independent
central authority that would require super majority vote to seek death). Finally, the Illinois
Commission on Capital Punishment has proposed that a committee of five individuals–the
Attorney General, the Cook County State’s Attorney, another county’s State’s Attorney, the
president of the Illinois State’s Attorneys Association, and a retired judge–approve a local
prosecutor’s request to seek the death penalty. See GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 84–85,
Recommendation 30 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission
_report/index.html. The Illinois legislature did not adopt this proposal. Thomas P. Sullivan,
Capital Punishment Reform: What’s Been Done and What Remains to Be Done, 51 FED. LAW. 37,
39 (2004). While these proposals have all recognized the benefits of capital charging, none would
require the same prosecutors to actually try the cases and thereby eliminate county involvement
altogether.
164. Federal cases are handled in a somewhat similar fashion. Whenever a federal grand
jury indicts a capital crime and the U.S Attorney intends to seek the death penalty, the U.S.
Attorney is required to notify the Department of Justice in writing. See Little, supra note 162, at
409–10 (detailing the Department of Justice’s process for deciding how to prosecute potentially
capital cases).
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all murder cases in that state, whether to pursue the death penalty. If
the local district attorney feels strongly that the defendant should face
the death penalty, she should have the option to write a memorandum
explaining why death is merited. Although such a memorandum is not
required, it would be forwarded to a junior prosecutor in the elite
capital unit. That junior prosecutor would then independently review
the case. Either building on the local district attorney’s memorandum
or starting from scratch, the junior prosecutor from the capital unit
would draft a neutral memorandum for the senior prosecutors that
analyzed the strength of the state’s case at guilt and sentencing. The
memorandum would be analogous to a bench memorandum that law
clerks write for their judges.
Defense counsel should be invited to make an oral presentation
before the junior prosecutor. Defense counsel may have facts relevant
to guilt or punishment that might not be fully appreciated on a paper
record. Such information may save prosecutors from seeking the death
penalty in a case that would be hard to win at trial or to defend on
appeal. Although it probably would not happen often, the opportunity
for an hour-long presentation by defense counsel might save the state
hundreds of thousands of dollars in trial and appeal costs by weeding
out those cases that would likely result in a life sentence or less.165
While the junior prosecutors should possess all information
about the case, at least three pieces of information—the race of the
defendant, the race of the victim,166 and the county where the crime
occurred—should be redacted from their memorandum so as not to
allow irrelevant criteria to influence the senior prosecutors in their
final charging decisions.167
Once complete, the memorandum should be provided to all
senior prosecutors. Those prosecutors would then vote on whether to
seek the death penalty. If a majority of the senior prosecutors votes to
165. See id. at 424–26 (noting that while he served on the Department of Justice’s capital
committee defense counsel always invoked their right to make a presentation to the committee
and that such presentations were effective); see also DeMay, supra note 150, at 810 (proposing
that prosecutors should provide defense counsel with “an opportunity to present arguments why
the defendant is not an appropriate candidate for the imposition of the death penalty”); Liebman,
supra note 92, at 2145 (proposing that prosecutors should provide all defense counsel with “a
meaningful opportunity to convince the district attorney to settle the case or at least not to
proceed capitally”).
166. In some instances, it may also be necessary to redact the name of the defendant or
victim if that name would indicate that the person is a member of a particular racial or ethnic
group.
167. See Little, supra note 162, at 411–12 (noting that federal cases are presented to the
Attorney General “ ‘race-blind,’ that is, devoid so far as possible of racial identification”). To the
extent that a defendant is accused of a hate crime, it would make little sense to keep that
information from the final decisionmakers, however.
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seek the death penalty, one senior prosecutor should take charge of
the case and should be assisted by the junior prosecutor who drafted
the memorandum. If the senior prosecutors vote against seeking the
death penalty, the case should then be returned to the local county
prosecutor to be handled as an “ordinary” murder case.
Committee charging would have numerous benefits. First, no
single person would be able to rely too heavily on her personal
experience. Different committee members with different life
experiences would balance each other out. Second, money would cease
to be a factor because the state would pay the bill, and the committee,
rather than the elected local prosecutor, would decide how to spend
the funds.168 While money may influence the total number of cases for
which the committee approves death, no individual case would turn on
local funding. Third, using a committee with steady membership
would promote consistency because the same group of prosecutors
would observe all of a state’s murder cases and would make all of the
charging decisions. A committee with consistent membership thus
would conduct an inverted proportionality review, in which cases
would be judged against one another up front, rather than after trial,
when time and money have already been expended.169 Relatedly,
committee charging would increase the probability of prosecutors
choosing the “right” cases—those that are most worthy of death—
because they would not be looking at cases in isolation. Finally, this
approach would uniquely use junior prosecutors to flush out the facts
and draft a neutral memorandum to help the final decisionmakers
make informed choices without reference to irrelevant factors such as
race and geography.
Given the benefits of charging committees, it is not surprising
that the Department of Justice has implemented a charging
committee approach similar to the one outlined above.170 Yet the
example from the federal system is problematic. The final decision
rests in the hands of a single individual, the Attorney General, 171 who

168. Of course, state prosecutors could also face funding pressures. At the statewide level,
however, resources are not as scarce as they are at the local level.
169. The Supreme Court has held that post-trial proportionality review is not required. See
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 49–51 (1984) (discussing Supreme Court precedent holding that
proportionality review is not required). Nevertheless, about half of the states that impose the
death penalty still provide for at least some level of proportionality review. See Maxine D.
Goodman, A Death Penalty Wake-Up Call: Reducing the Risk of Racial Discrimination in Capital
Punishment, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 29, 44 n.114 (2007) (listing states that do and do not
provide for proportionality review).
170. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
171. Little, supra note 162, at 412.
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(as a political appointee) might never have tried a capital case.172
Moreover, even if the Attorney General always follows the committee’s
collective wisdom, the federal government would still not achieve a
“pure” elite capital punishment unit because the prosecutors who
constitute the charging committee at Main Justice are not the same
prosecutors who handle the actual trials. Rather, local U.S. Attorneys
prosecute the cases. In fact, in the federal system the local U.S.
Attorneys can cut the rug out from under the central charging
committee by taking a case where the Attorney General has decided to
seek death and then negotiate it down to a prison term without
consulting Main Justice.173
To maximize the benefits of committee charging, it is important
that the committee’s decision be final and that the members of the
committee making the charging decisions be the very same
prosecutors who are in the trenches actually prosecuting the cases. If
we are able to attract the very best lawyers to serve in that capacity,
there will be greater uniformity and fairness in the death penalty
system. As the next section recognizes, however, attracting the best
lawyers is a key challenge.
5. Attracting the Best Lawyers to Work on Capital Cases
One lingering but important question remains about the
feasibility of statewide capital punishment units: How will we
convince excellent local prosecutors and defense attorneys to leave
their home jurisdictions and travel the state to work on death penalty
cases? In other words, will excellent lawyers decline to participate in
such a system because it is too inconvenient? Although some lawyers
will be unwilling to serve, there are several reasons why many
lawyers would uproot themselves temporarily to take on this
important task.
First, and hopefully most importantly, excellent prosecutors
and defense lawyers have a commitment to justice and improving the
criminal justice system. Committed lawyers regularly sacrifice
convenience to further public service goals. And for lawyers who feel

172. For instance, recent Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, while having a wide variety of
legal experience, never served as a prosecutor before becoming Attorney General and having
final say over capital charging. See Jason McLure, Staying the Course: The AG Hasn’t Satisfied
Critics Who Doubt His Independence, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at 1.
173. See Little, supra note 162, at 417–18 (“Under the protocols, United States Attorneys in
the field may dispose of federal capital cases, once charged, without advance approval or review
by the Attorney General or Main Justice.”).
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strongly about capital punishment, either on the prosecution or
defense side, the opportunity to devote all of their attention to a small
number of very important cases would be a big draw.174
A second reason why lawyers would sign up for an elite capital
trial unit is prestige. Capital cases are already considered to be the
most prominent cases in the criminal justice system, and lawyers are
eager to sink their teeth into the biggest cases.175 Thus, many will be
on board from the beginning.
Third, prestige often translates into career advancement,
including a higher-profile office. Serving as an elite prosecutor (and to
a lesser extent as an elite defense lawyer) would be a stepping-stone to
a judgeship or other elected office, such as attorney general or
governor. And to the extent that Presidents look for the best possible
lawyers when selecting U.S. Attorneys, trying exclusively high-profile
death penalty cases would be a helpful qualification.
In fact, prosecutors already accept assignments outside their
geographic areas in order to heighten their prestige. After the collapse
of energy giant Enron, the Department of Justice staffed the Enron
Task Force with elite prosecutors from across the country.176 Members
of the Task Force went on to secure prominent and lucrative positions,
including Attorney General of Oregon,177 head of the Department of
Justice Criminal Division, Interim U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York, Chief of Staff for the Director of the FBI, and
partnership in some of the best white-shoe law firms in the country.178
This model of mobility is currently employed at the FBI, where agents
174. See Editorial, Regional Public Defender’s Office Has Worked Well, LUBBOCK
AVALANCHE-J., Dec. 10, 2008 (describing the West Texas Regional Public Defender Office that
was created with the support of sixty-five counties and noting that the office has been a success
“[b]ecause the sole focus is capital cases, [and] the staff is able to get to work immediately on a
case and spend a lot of time preparing for it”).
175. See Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty:
The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates’ Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 941, 945–46 (1994) (discussing how some elected district attorneys highlight capital
convictions in their campaign literature); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 155 (2004) (same).
176. John R. Kroger, Remarks: Enron and Multi-Jurisdictional Fraud, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
1657, 1660 (2007) (explaining that the Enron Task Force “grabbed prosecutors from all over the
country–Chicago, Boston, Orange County, New York, San Francisco”). In the Enron case the
nationwide task force model was troublesome because prosecutors were asked to temporarily
relocate across the country, not to permanently take up a new job for a long period of time. This
led to frequent turnover. Id. This approach can be avoided at the statewide level because lawyers
will be taking permanent or at least long-term positions.
177. Oregon Department of Justice, Biography of Attorney General John Kroger,
http://www.doj.state.or.us/ag_bio.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
178. Mary Flood, Task Force Enjoys Post-Enron Success, HOUSTON CHRON., June 2, 2008, at
1.
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are often asked to relocate to more prestigious and career-enhancing
jobs.179
A fourth reason to join the statewide capital unit would be the
added compensation that the legislature should provide. Prosecutors
do not take their positions for the money, and many defense attorneys
also are not primarily concerned with salary. However, if lawyers are
still permitted to practice in an area about which they are passionate,
extra compensation may be a draw.180 Legislatures should be willing
to increase the salary for elite death penalty lawyers because, as
explained in Part III.A below, enormous savings can be realized later
in truncated appeals and habeas corpus petitions. Finally, although it
would not be politically popular, it is essential that there be salary
parity between prosecutors and defense lawyers in order to attract
high quality defense lawyers.181
III. WHY A STATEWIDE SYSTEM WOULD ACTUALLY SAVE MONEY AND
DEPOLITICIZE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
There are a multitude of problems with capital punishment in
the United States, ranging from racial discrimination to wrongful
conviction. A statewide death penalty cannot cure all of these ills, but
it can be expected to have numerous benefits. Two are particularly
worthy of discussion. A statewide system staffed by elite lawyers and
judges at trial would help to reallocate more funding to the early
stages of death penalty cases, rather than focusing enormous state
funding on appeals. In this respect, a statewide approach could be less
costly for states than the current system, while simultaneously
reducing problems such as wrongful convictions and racial

179. The FBI’s website explains that “all Special Agents are subject to transfer at any time
to meet the organizational and program needs of the FBI. Special Agents accept the possibility of
transfer as a condition of their employment.” Federal Bureau of Investigations, Special Agent
Career Path Program, http://www.fbijobs.gov/113.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2010); see also KURT
EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT 32–33 (2000) (detailing the inner workings of the FBI’s
investigation of Archer Daniels Midland and discussing how some of the key agents had
relocated from across the country).
180. See Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
441, 442 (2009) (arguing for financial rewards to “attract and retain the best candidates and also
encourage those who are already prosecutors to perform better”); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for
Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 879 (1995) (“Significant evidence indicates that the behavior of
prosecutors could be affected by financial incentives.”).
181. See James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315,
328, 337 (2002) (recognizing inadequate compensation of capital defense attorneys as a limiting
factor in the quality of representation in capital cases and advocating parity between defense
and prosecution resources).
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discrimination. Second, the use of elite lawyers would restore faith in
the death penalty system. This would help to depoliticize the death
penalty by eliminating many arguments of proponents (who see too
much attention focused on appeals) and opponents (who criticize the
shabby defense representation and arbitrary prosecutorial discretion
afforded under the current system).
A. Reducing Costs and Providing for More Efficient Capital
Punishment
The most obvious objection to a statewide capital punishment
system is that it would be expensive. While some states do provide
occasional supplemental funding to counties for “extraordinary” cases,
for the most part states do not fund capital trials.182 Accordingly,
moving to a statewide death penalty system would cost states huge
sums that were previously funded by counties. Although it might be
nice for states to invest heavily in the important life-or-death
decisions made at capital trials, there are countless other matters on
which states could focus their criminal justice spending.183 For
instance, it would be worthwhile to have more state-funded drug
programs, crime prevention programs, or organized crime task
forces.184 Because money is limited and states have countless other
priorities, there is good reason why states should not volunteer to take
on large capital trial expenditures.185
While the cost criticism may seem compelling, it is ultimately
flawed. Most states that authorize capital punishment already spend
huge sums of state money on capital cases. While counties typically

182. See infra notes 223–227 and accompanying text.
183. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument From
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004) (“Many public services are
underfunded, including foster care, medical care, indigent defense, and public schools.”).
184. See James R. Acker, Be Careful What You Ask For: Lessons from New York’s Recent
Experience with Capital Punishment, 32 VT. L. REV. 683, 719 n.155 (2008) (citing testimony of
various criminal justice experts on other uses for funds currently spent on death penalty cases).
185. Indeed, costs have been a major reason why states have recently considered abolishing
the death penalty. See Ian Urbina, In Push to End Death Penalty, Some States Cite Cost-Cutting,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at A1 (discussing legislative efforts to repeal the death penalty in
Maryland, Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, and New Hampshire in part based on the economic
expense of capital cases). Costs played a role in New Jersey’s recent abolition of the death
penalty. See NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 31–34 (2007), available at
www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf (recommending abolition in large part based on
the costs); Jeremy W. Peters, Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, then Commutes Sentences of
8, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at B3 (discussing New Jersey’s abolition of the death penalty). In
tight fiscal times, it is hard to imagine states volunteering to spend huge sums of additional
money.
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fund trials, many states foot the bill for appeals and habeas corpus
challenges to death sentences,186 and these post-trial proceedings are
very expensive.187 The question therefore should not be whether states
would have to outlay large sums of money to create a statewide unit to
handle the trial of all capital cases. Rather, the relevant question
should be whether a statewide trial unit would save states money over
time by reducing the huge costs of capital appeals and habeas
petitions. There are at least three reasons to answer that question in
the affirmative.
1. Fewer Reversals Means Fewer Retrials, Fewer Subsequent Appeals,
and Lower Costs
First, if a case is tried by the best prosecutors and defense
attorneys, the case is less likely to be reversed on appeal. This would
eliminate the costs of retrial (which would have been borne by the
counties under the system currently in place in most jurisdictions),
and it would eliminate the costs of all the appeals following the retrial.
Given that these appeals run for years and cost hundreds of thousands
of dollars, the state will save huge sums of money on the back end.
For instance, in December 2008, the Supreme Court heard oral
argument in Cone v. Bell, a death penalty case that raised a technical
question about federal courts’ ability to reconsider state court
findings.188 According to one observer, Justice Scalia began the
argument “incredulous that lawyers were at it again” and asked, “How
long has this case been going on?”189 Justice Scalia no doubt
remembered Cone’s case, which the Supreme Court had reversed
twice since his initial death sentence in 1984.190 In the 2008 oral
argument, Cone’s lawyer made a compelling argument that his case
should be reversed a third time because the local county prosecutor
who tried the case had suppressed favorable evidence.191 The county
prosecutors did not argue in their defense. It was left to the Deputy
Attorney General, a state employee utilizing state resources, to try to
186. Gershowitz, supra note 15, at 864.
187. See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE COST OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN MARYLAND 2 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411625.html
(finding that a Maryland death penalty case cost $1.9 million more than a non-death case and
that about 30 percent of the added cost is attributable to post-trial costs).
188. Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (2009).
189. Robert Barnes, Justices Question Withholding of Evidence in Capital Case, WASH. POST,
Dec. 10, 2008, at A2.
190. Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Misconduct in Tennessee Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2008, at A26.
191. Id.
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preserve the case on appeal.192 Although she fought admirably, the
Deputy Attorney General was forced repeatedly to concede that the
local trial prosecutors failed to turn over favorable evidence and that
their arguments to the jury “overstated” their case.193 Had the case
been tried by an elite team of prosecutors, the misconduct would
probably not have occurred, thus saving years of appeals and millions
of dollars in state-funded appellate costs.
A simple numerical example illustrates the multiple ways by
which elite statewide capital trial units would save costs on appeal.
Assume that under the current capital punishment system, five out of
ten cases are reversed on appeal, and that when those cases are
retried, they result in five new death sentences.194 Those five new
death sentences will be the subject of five new sets of appeals. In total,
then, the state will be responsible for defending fifteen cases on appeal
(the original ten appeals and the extra five following retrials). Now
imagine a system using an elite group of prosecutors and defense
lawyers that tries the cases with full knowledge of the law and an eye
toward avoiding reversal. Such lawyers will be far less likely to
purposefully or inadvertently hide favorable evidence. To be
conservative, imagine that four out of ten death sentences are
reversed on appeal and subsequently retried. The state will now be
responsible for only fourteen appeals rather than fifteen. The cost
savings in avoiding just one set of appeals will be considerable.195
However, an elite prosecution unit would eliminate far more
than this one set of appeals. Utilizing an elite prosecution unit to
make capital charging decisions would likely reduce the number of
marginal cases in which prosecutors seek the death penalty in the
first place, thus reducing the number of death verdicts that states
would have to defend on appeal. Because county prosecutors reap
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Professor Liebman’s study from 1973–1995 found a 68 percent reversal rate. LIEBMAN
ET AL., supra note 8, at 8. Given the difficulty of prevailing under the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act and a more conservative federal judiciary, the reversal rate is likely
considerably lower today. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Violence and the Truth, 76 IND. L.J. 939, 946
(2001) (criticizing the Liebman study for assuming a constant error rate over time which “is not a
safe assumption, especially in federal habeas, where reversal rates have been dropping as the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment law has gradually begun to stabilize”). On the
increasing difficulty of prevailing under the AEDPA, see John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype”
and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 284 (2006).
195. See, e.g., Lise Olsen, State Fund Doesn’t Provide Much Relief from Case Costs; Despite
Promises, State Fund Doesn’t Provide Much Relief from Case Expenses, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 8, 2001, at A8 (“In a single resentencing last year, Thurston County spent
$1.1 million as it attempted to put double-killer Mitchell Rupe back on death row nineteen years
after his original conviction.”).
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political benefits from being tough on crime but do not typically have
to pay for expensive appeals, they have an incentive to seek the death
penalty in marginal cases that may be hard to defend on appeal.196 An
elite group of state prosecutors may choose not to seek the death
penalty in such marginal cases, thus reducing the number of capital
prosecutions.197 And because it is very possible that the marginal
death penalty case would be reversed on appeal and retried, state
prosecutors would be spared having to defend that case on appeal not
once, but twice.
In the hypothetical example above, state prosecutors would
eliminate three sets of death penalty appeals. In practice, the number
could well be higher. Because each capital case involves multiple
levels of direct and collateral review, eliminating multiple sets of
death penalty appeals potentially would save millions of dollars in
appellate costs. (And this is to say nothing of the savings at trials
because the cases will not have to be retried.) These savings in turn
may fund a substantial portion of the elite statewide capital trial
units.
2. Better Trial Lawyers Means Less Time Spent on Non-Meritorious
Issues on Appeal
Utilizing an elite team of trial lawyers would also reduce the
number of non-meritorious claims that presently consume the time of
appellate judges, law clerks, appellate prosecutors, and appointed
defense lawyers. Presently, death row inmates litigate dozens of issues
on appeal and post-conviction review. Two of the most common issues
are Brady challenges (arguing that prosecutors withheld favorable
evidence) and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.198 While neither
type of claim would be eliminated by implementing a statewide death

196. See Gershowitz, supra note 15, at 877 (“Under the current system, prosecutors who
procure death sentences are rewarded with good publicity, promotions, and perhaps even with
judicial office. By contrast, those same prosecutors suffer little stigma when death sentences are
reversed on appeal because many years have gone by . . . and the public’s attention has moved on
to new death penalty cases.”).
197. Of course, state prosecutors will still have to defend a non-death verdict on appeal.
However, such cases will be cheaper to defend because, unlike death-penalty cases, non-death
cases typically do not carry a right of automatic appeal to the state supreme court and the lack of
a death sentence will remove numerous legal issues that otherwise would have been litigated.
See ROMAN ET AL., supra note 187, at 25 (finding in a 2008 study of Maryland that cases
resulting in a death sentence cost hundreds of thousands of dollars more at the state appellate
level than cases where death was not sought).
198. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 1108 n.5 (“The three most common species of claims in
capital cases are ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Batson claims, and Brady claims.”).
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penalty system, both claims would be reduced, and this reduction
would result in significant cost savings.
First consider Brady claims. To state a successful Brady claim,
the prisoner must demonstrate that the government failed to turn
over evidence that was not only favorable but also material,199
meaning evidence that would create a reasonable probability of
changing the outcome.200 In the current system, there are very few
prosecutors who would knowingly withhold impeachment or
exculpatory evidence that could reasonably be expected to change the
outcome of a defendant’s capital case.201 Thus, transitioning to a
statewide unit would not accomplish much in these situations.
However, prosecutors often may accidentally fail to turn over
marginal evidence, and these more frequent occurrences might lead
defendants to allege unsuccessful Brady violations. Prosecutors who
are not well trained or lack death penalty experience may, with the
purest of motives, fail to turn over potential Brady material simply
because they did not realize it should have been disclosed. For
example, in a case where multiple witnesses saw the defendant kill
the victim, the prosecution may neglect to disclose to the defendant
that one of the witnesses had a prior conviction for theft or that he
initially stated the wrong time of the offense.202 This impeachment
evidence is favorable and should be turned over to the defendant,
though it is exceedingly unlikely that an appellate court would reverse
a conviction or death sentence when there are multiple additional
witnesses tying the defendant to the crime.
Nevertheless, because the good faith of the prosecutor is not
relevant to whether a Brady violation occurred,203 prosecutors cannot
simply dispose of Brady claims by saying that they acted with pure
motives. Rather, any potential Brady violation must be briefed by
prosecutors and defense lawyers. And briefing is expensive. Due to the
complexity of the law under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the Chief Justice of the Washington Supreme
Court estimated that the size of appellate briefs in death penalty cases

199. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
200. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (“The evidence is material only if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”).
201. Gershowitz, supra note 144, at 1061–62.
202. See Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1111–15 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing how
prosecutor failed to disclose that state witness in a capital case had several traffic charges that
prosecutor helped to resolve but that were not material for Brady purposes).
203. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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increased from 50 to 250 pages between 1990 and 2000.204 Such briefs
take upwards of three thousand hours of attorney time to draft.205
Appellate judges also spend significant time reviewing these briefs
and drafting opinions. The matter might then be remanded to the trial
court to hold a hearing and find further facts.206 At the end of the day,
because the materiality standard for a successful Brady claim is
onerous,207 the prisoner is likely to lose. But not before the state is
forced to spend a substantial amount of money to fight the nonmeritorious claim.
An elite team of prosecutors that focuses exclusively on
handling capital cases is much more likely to prevent non-meritorious
Brady claims. These prosecutors would know to disclose evidence that
is arguably favorable to the defendant. Thus, prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and appellate judges (and possibly trial judges on remand)
would not have to spend valuable time and money litigating issues
that, while sufficiently plausible to provoke an appeal, would
ultimately be resolved against the defendant.208
Indeed, elite prosecutors could likely conduct “cleaner”209 trials
than less experienced local prosecutors on a host of issues similar to
Brady claims. Highly trained capital prosecutors could avoid claims
that inadmissible evidence was offered,210 that admissible evidence
was excluded,211 or that inappropriate arguments were made to the
204. RICHARD P. GUY, STATUS REPORT ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN WASHINGTON STATE 10
(2000), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/deathpenalty/deathpenalty.pdf.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 11 (“Washington Supreme Court review not infrequently results in additional
trial level hearings in the county where the case originated.”).
207. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (clarifying the materiality
standard); Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE
L.J. 1450, 1455 (2006) (noting that Brady violations are rarely identified and that “even when
[prisoners] do their convictions are rarely overturned because they face a tremendous burden on
appeal”).
208. See Liebman, supra note 181, at 339 (recognizing that procedural roadblocks to habeas
review add litigation time and that reducing litigation would best be accomplished “by
eliminating altogether the most frequently litigated habeas claims”). Professor Liebman has
proposed that states ensure improved trial and direct appellate review in exchange for death row
prisoners foregoing substantial amounts of habeas review. Id. at 334. To date, states have not
embraced this very logical proposal.
209. No case is perfect. By “cleaner,” I mean a trial that leaves open far fewer grounds for a
defendant’s appeal.
210. See, e.g., Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 659–60 (Ky. 2003) (concluding in a
death penalty case that the trial court admitted inappropriate character evidence but that it was
harmless).
211. See State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 519 (Mo. 2004) (considering in capital case whether
excluded letter from defendant’s grandmother amounted to mitigating evidence, but finding that
it was cumulative and therefore harmless); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 959–60 (Fla. 2003)
(concluding that the trial court should have admitted letters showing co-defendant’s domination
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jury.212 Although each of these examples constitutes viable legal
issues, these issues are rarely successful on appeal.213 Thus, they
consume time to brief and argue but are very unlikely to be resolved in
the defendant’s favor. Put simply, the better the prosecutors, the less
opportunity the defendant has to raise time-consuming and ultimately
unsuccessful legal claims on appeal and post-conviction review.
Of course, the counterargument exists that proactively
eliminating the defendant’s non-meritorious arguments only goes so
far. Critics might argue that a defendant can always find something to
point to in order to challenge his conviction and death sentence on
appeal. While that may be true, there is a big difference between a
reasonable challenge that ultimately proves to be unsuccessful (such
as the ones suggested above) and one so frivolous that it does not pass
the laugh test (and can thus be easily disposed of by a court). Defense
attorneys are ethically forbidden from raising frivolous issues on
appeal214 and would risk sanctions by doing so.215 And while prisoners
are free to file their own briefs raising issues, courts would not likely
devote significant time and attention to those issues when defense
attorneys are unwilling to raise the issues themselves.216
In sum, while it is impossible to eliminate all issues on appeal
(and, indeed, defense lawyers are obligated to file Anders briefs when

over the defendant but finding that the error was harmless because it could not outweigh the five
aggravating factors, including that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated fashion).
212. See Williams v. State, 188 P.3d 208, 230 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008) (concluding that
prosecutor’s argument to jury that they would devalue victim’s life by giving less than a death
sentence was improper but nevertheless harmless error); Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1062
(Fla. 2007) (finding that the prosecutor’s improper argument that the jury should give the
defendant the same mercy that defendant showed to the victim was harmless error); Duncan v.
State, No. 05-00-01773-CR, 2002 WL 1611848, at *2 (Tex. App. July 23, 2002) (finding that
multiple inappropriate references to defendant’s parole eligibility if he did not receive a death
sentence was harmless error).
213. See Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible
Error, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 894–95 (1992) (concluding that reversal for evidentiary reasons
is rare).
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008) (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous . . . .”).
215. See Brent E. Newton, Almendarez-Torres and the Anders Ethical Dilemma, 45
HOUSTON L. REV. 747, 748 n.3 (2008) (collecting cases in which appellate counsel were
sanctioned for filing frivolous claims).
216. See A.C. Pritchard, Auctioning Justice: Legal and Market Mechanisms for Allocating
Criminal Appellate Counsel, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1997) (“The onslaught of frivolous
appeals unleashed by Anders has driven the courts to a system of judicial triage. Confronted with
ever-increasing numbers of appeals, courts have adopted screening mechanisms to sort out cases
warranting close judicial attention from those appropriate for summary rejection.”).
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there is no viable legal issue),217 it is possible to reduce dramatically
the time that prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, clerks, and court
staff spend on non-meritorious claims. A proactive elite team of
prosecutors can therefore reduce appellate costs.
The same logic applies with even greater force to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. The most common allegation in postconviction death penalty cases is that the defendant did not receive
adequate counsel.218 Too often, defendants have valid or at least
colorable claims to support their ineffectiveness allegations. When
these claims are indeed valid, the death sentences (and perhaps also
the underlying convictions) should be reversed.219 But, once again,
reversals are very much the exception, not the rule.220 Defendants
consume enormous amounts of court time with ineffectiveness
challenges by submitting supporting documentation and voluminous
briefs that require prosecutors to make responsive filings and force
judges to review all of the materials and issue factual findings. Judges
in the Sixth Circuit have accused some defense counsel of sandbagging
in capital cases so as to create ineffectiveness claims and delay the
time between conviction and execution.221 In the vast majority of
cases, however, all the time and money is for naught because the
claims are rejected.
Now imagine that instead of your average local public
defender, the defendant was represented by an elite lawyer from the
217. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (providing that counsel must file a brief
stating that she has reviewed the record carefully and identify the legal issues she believes are
frivolous but that an appellate court might determine to be non-frivolous before the attorney will
be permitted to withdraw as counsel on direct appeal); see Newton, supra note 215, at 757
(explaining that “the federal courts of appeals have continued to require Anders-type ‘no merit’
briefs in federal appeals”).
218. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 114 (2008) (“Studies of
postconviction filings show that ineffective assistance of counsel is the most commonly raised
claim during appeals.”).
219. I am in agreement with critics who maintain that it is too difficult to demonstrate a
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that the standard should be changed. See,
e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) (“The courts should broaden their focus
to concentrate on the fairness of the proceedings rather than the absence of identifiable errors by
defense counsel.”).
220. See Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2068 (2000) (“It is thus exceedingly difficult to win a claim
under the standard established in Strickland.”).
221. See Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564, 588 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boggs, C.J., concurring)
(“If counsel provides fully-effective assistance, and the jury simply does not buy the defense, then
the defendant is likely to be executed. However, if counsel provides ineffective assistance, then
the prisoner is likely to be spared, certainly for many years, and frequently forever.”). For an
analysis of whether sandbagging would be good strategy, see Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective
Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1645, 1675–80 (2008).
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statewide capital punishment unit. Unlike some local death penalty
attorneys, that lawyer has a decade of felony experience, at least five
death penalty cases under her belt, and no successful ineffective
assistance challenges against her. Also imagine that the defense
lawyer was hand-selected by the state attorney general based on
interviews with her colleagues and judges from around the state.222
Although these elite defense attorneys would inevitably still be the
subject of some ineffective assistance challenges, the number of claims
would likely decrease by a substantial margin. Even if ineffectiveness
claims are still filed, appellate judges would have confidence that most
are frivolous, and they would likely devote considerably less attention
and resources to them. Put simply, with elite defense lawyers
handling cases at trial, expensive but marginal ineffectiveness claims
would be less prevalent and time-consuming on appeal, thus saving
time and money.
3. Requiring Counties to Contribute Money to States for Capital
Cases, Rather than Vice Versa
Under the current system, most funding for capital trials is
provided by counties.223 In some states, however, the counties receive
supplemental assistance from the state treasury. For instance, under
Washington State’s Extraordinary Criminal Justice Act, counties can
apply to the state for reimbursement of the costs of aggravated
murder cases.224 Unfortunately, the program has not managed to put
much money in the hands of counties.225 The state of Indiana is much
more generous and reimburses 50 percent of indigent defense costs.226
Most impressively, the state of Illinois created a Capital Litigation

222. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing proposed qualifications for capital defense
lawyers).
223. Vick, supra note 112, at 394.
224. GUY, supra note 204, at 8.
225. See WASHINGTON DEATH PENALTY ASSISTANCE CTR., WASHINGTON’S DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEM: A REVIEW OF THE COSTS, LENGTH AND RESULTS OF CAPITAL CASES IN WASHINGTON
STATE 11, 13 (2004) (explaining that a substantial amount of state money has ended up being
sent to large counties and to non-death penalty cases); Olsen, supra note 195 (“In the first year of
the program, counties asked for $4.5 million; the Legislature has set aside only $550,000.”);
Report: State Rarely Aids Counties With Murder-Case Costs: 3 Out of 4 Requests Denied;
Defendants’ Legal Bills Usually Paid By Public, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at B2 (explaining
that only one county received assistance and only a fraction of what it requested).
226. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument From
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 815 (2004); see also Editorial, The Cost to Execute,
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Oct. 18, 2006, at A10 (“Counties can be reimbursed for up to 50
percent of costs.”).
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Trust Fund that provides substantial supplemental funding (though
not full reimbursement) for death penalty trials.227
If states were to assume responsibility for prosecuting death
penalty cases, this model would be inverted. Counties could be asked
to provide a modest amount of funding when states take over their
cases and seek the death penalty. States would have discretion in how
much they asked counties to pay. Larger counties could be called on to
pay more than medium-sized counties. Small counties could be
exempted altogether. States could also adopt a more complicated
approach that tied the county’s obligation to whether it requested that
the state seek the death penalty. For instance, counties could be asked
to pay for 20 percent of the costs of trial. However, if the county had
filed a memorandum advocating that the defendant face death, the
county’s share of the costs could be increased to 30 percent.228 Either
scenario would amount to a substantial windfall for the county
because even with a more expensive elite team of statewide lawyers,
the county would still pay less than if it had handled the case itself.
There are various other approaches states could utilize to seek
reimbursement from counties. The key point, however, is that the
state could seek to make up some of the money it is expending to try
the cases. Together with the savings on appellate costs, the
supplementation from the counties may help states break even or
reduce their total costs.
***
In sum, there is good reason to believe that the costs of a
statewide capital trial unit could be offset from savings on appeals.
Elite prosecutors would exercise their charging discretion more
carefully and handle trials more effectively, thus reducing the number
of appeals that states would have to fund. And because of their skills
and reputations, elite prosecutors and defense lawyers would reduce
the time and money the death penalty system currently spends on
non-meritorious claims. Finally, to the extent there is a shortfall,
counties could be asked to contribute a portion of the trial costs they
would have paid if they had handled the trial.

227. Hayler, supra note 128, at 435–36.
228. By contrast, if the county recommended against seeking death and the statewide
prosecutors chose to do so anyway, the county’s obligation could be dropped to 10 percent of the
trial costs. From a financial perspective, counties therefore would have an incentive to oppose
capital charges. Yet, they could not do so vocally because it would be politically unpalatable to be
on record opposing the death penalty in gruesome cases.
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B. Depoliticizing the Death Penalty through an Elite Group of Lawyers
Assuming a statewide capital punishment system would cost
roughly the same amount of money as the current system, if not less,
the final question is whether such an approach would be beneficial. To
answer this question, it is worth taking a moment to put the flaws of
the current death penalty system in perspective.
As almost every observer knows, there are numerous problems
with the implementation of capital punishment in the United States:
racial discrimination, geographic arbitrariness, underfunded defense
lawyers, and wrongful convictions, to name just a few.229 These are
serious problems, and scholars are certainly justified in proposing
remedies for them. The proposed remedies, however, often tend to be
more procedural protections and greater appellate review.230
Unfortunately, these remedies tend to aggravate the other problem
with capital punishment that often goes unrecognized by academics:
the frequent reversals of convictions and sentences and the
concomitantly long delay in carrying out executions. Proponents of
capital punishment complain, sometimes with good reason, that the
death penalty system is bogged down by needless legal wrangling that
results in decades of delay for defendants who deserve death under
states’ laws. Opponents respond that without the long and careful
review, wrongful death sentences, including execution of the innocent,
would be carried out. And so we are often left at stalemate. The death
penalty remains highly politicized,231 with proponents and opponents
alike suspicious of reform proposals.232
Obviously, abolitionists will never be satisfied with simply
fixing the death penalty system to make it more equitable. Fervent
229. See generally DAVID R. DOW, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON
AMERICA’S DEATH ROW (2005) (chronicling the systemic problems with capital punishment);
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 359 (1995) (questioning
why the Supreme Court’s regulation of capital punishment has been “so messy and so
meaningless”).
230. See Liebman, supra note 92, at 2136 (“Most proposals for curing [the ills of capital
punishment] are doomed to make it worse. Typically, those proposals aim merely to treat one or
another procedural symptom at either the stern or the stem, without attacking the disease itself
(the skewed incentive system) or its principal substantive symptom (the overproduction of
death).”).
231. See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283,
285 (2008) (explaining how the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence allowed the death
penalty to become highly politicized).
232. See Douglas A. Berman, Reorienting Progressive Perspectives for Twenty-First Century
Punishment Realities, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 12 (2008) (noting that legal reformers’
“advocacy is likely to grate on those not categorically opposed to the punishment of death”).
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supporters of capital punishment will not find it acceptable to
marginally decrease, rather than greatly reduce, appeals and
reversals. Recognizing that these two polar opposites will never agree
to a modest reform proposal, the question then is whether those
interested in reforming the existing system can find merit in a
statewide capital punishment system. The answer should be
affirmative because the existence of an elite statewide capital
punishment unit would restore confidence in the system and likely
improve accuracy, while limiting appeals and reducing reversals. In
short, there is something for both sides of the debate.
First, an elite statewide unit staffed by the best prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and judges should help to ensure that the most
culpable defendants are the ones who will be sentenced to death. Elite
prosecutors who focus exclusively on death penalty cases would have a
better sense of who is truly deserving of death than county prosecutors
who only occasionally handle capital cases. And because the state
would pay the bill, rather than cash-strapped counties, money should
play no role in deciding which defendants face death.233 This
consequence alone should amount to a dramatic improvement over the
current system. Furthermore, because the race of the victim and the
defendant would be redacted from the charging committee’s file, bias
would be reduced, if not eliminated completely.234 Thereafter, once the
defendant is on trial for her life, her sentence would not be based on
the lottery of which defense lawyer she receives.235 Because all cases
would be handled by elite defense lawyers, we can be sure that when a
defendant is sentenced to death it is because she deserved it, not
because she had a lousy lawyer.236 Relatedly, because defense lawyers
would be funded at the state level with resources equivalent to
prosecutors, we can be sure that the death sentence was not the

233. See Liebman, supra note 181, at 328 (recognizing inadequate compensation of capital
defense attorneys as a limiting factor in the quality of representation in capital cases).
234. See Little, supra note 162, at 412 (describing how, in federal death-penalty cases, the
Justice Department “self-consciously eliminates racial information from the Attorney General’s
review process”).
235. See Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery–Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in
Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679,
685 (1990) (“In practice, however, the system for imposing capital punishment is most often a
game of chance in which the winners and losers are distinguished not by their criminal and
moral culpability, but by the luck of the lawyers they draw.”).
236. See Craig Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations: Expanding the Zone of
Perceived Injustice in Death Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 163 (2006) (arguing
that “too many defense attorneys lack the kind of training and professional experience that is
needed to find and develop th[e] humanizing testimony” that is necessary to separate the truly
death-worthy).
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product of a resource deficit.237 An elite statewide capital punishment
unit can provide assurance that the defendant received a fair shake
during the charging process and at trial.238
Second, an elite capital punishment unit should reduce the
possibility of convicting (and later executing) innocent defendants.
Statewide prosecutors would be under less pressure than local district
attorneys to achieve convictions and death sentences for high-profile
crimes.239 They would therefore be less likely to push the envelope and
seek death when there is a plausible claim that the defendant might
be innocent.240 More importantly, because a statewide system would
provide every defendant with a highly qualified and adequately
funded defense attorney, the risk of a wrongful conviction should be
dramatically reduced. Quite simply, good lawyering at trial, not years
of habeas proceedings, is the best defense against a wrongful
execution.241 Additionally, because each prosecutor would be carefully
vetted to select only those with sterling ethical reputations, it is highly
unlikely that the defendant would be prosecuted by an overly
aggressive lawyer willing to cut corners and risk a wrongful
conviction.
Third, an elite statewide unit would reduce the number of
plausible and frivolous appellate claims that defendants could raise.
Defendants represented by elite lawyers would be unable to allege
plausible ineffective assistance of counsel claims.242 Likewise, elite
prosecutors would steer clear of most Brady claims, as well as

237. Id. at 164 (“[D]efense attorneys in many jurisdictions are overmatched and outspent by
experienced prosecutors who have the state’s considerable resources at their disposal. This
disparity in resources increases the likelihood that wrongful condemnations will occur in death
penalty cases.”).
238. As Professor David Dow has argued, the issue of innocence in death penalty cases often
distracts courts and observers from the numerous other problems with the system that deny
defendants a fair trial. David R. Dow, Death By Good Intentions, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2006, at
B7.
239. See Michael Hall, Death Isn’t Fair, TEX. MONTHLY, Dec. 2002, at 122 (noting that
district attorneys consider “how much publicity the case is getting” in deciding whether or not to
seek the death penalty).
240. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 475 (1996) (“Erroneous convictions . . . may occur
disproportionately often in capital cases for two types of reasons: (1) Because of factors that are
common or inevitable in capital prosecutions, but that occur in other cases as well—for instance,
the fact that the crime involves homicide, or that it was heavily publicized; (2) Because of
consequences that flow from the demand for the death penalty itself.”).
241. Id. at 496 (“Other things being equal, higher quality representation will decrease the
likelihood of conviction, and may operate as a check on errors and misconduct that drive some
innocent capital defendants to trial and to conviction.”).
242. See supra notes 218–222 and accompanying text.
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incorrect jury instructions and evidentiary errors.243 This would serve
to eliminate some (though not all) of the defendants’ appellate issues.
In turn, there should be fewer reversals on appeal, fewer remands for
evidentiary hearings, shorter response briefs for government lawyers
to draft, and fewer legal issues for appellate judges to decide.244 The
cost savings would be enormous, and the time from conviction to
execution would be greatly shortened.
However, the greatest benefit of an elite statewide death
penalty unit may be intangible. The problems with capital
punishment—particularly wrongful convictions—have shaken faith in
the legal system.245 A statewide death penalty system staffed by elite
lawyers could help to restore confidence in the system. With an elite
capital unit in place, wrongful convictions should decrease, and
reversal rates for clearly guilty defendants should lessen. There
should be fewer alarming news stories about atrocious defense
lawyers and overly aggressive prosecutors. The elite capital unit
should be able to carry out its work without it being politicized. While
the crimes themselves will continue to be news stories, the criminal
justice process should fade into a less prominent place in the
background.
CONCLUSION
Nearly two decades ago, Professor Vivian Berger explained
that just as we would not allow chiropractors to conduct brain surgery
simply because a town has no brain surgeons, we should not permit
inadequate criminal lawyers to handle capital cases simply because
they are the only lawyers available.246 In this Article, I have argued
that even having competent lawyers handling capital cases is not
sufficient. Specialists are needed. The death penalty system should be
staffed by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges who are not only

243. See supra notes 199–213 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 195–197 and accompanying text.
245. See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2008)
(recognizing that stories of exonerations “convey a mixed message to the American public [and]
demonstrate that the system is flawed – that the police occasionally arrest the wrong people,
that prosecutors charge them with crimes, and that judges and juries fail them” but also lead
some to argue that “the post-conviction process serves an effective corrective function”).
246. Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases,
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 254 (1990–1991) (citing Minority Report of Stephen B.
Bright, in TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY
CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS
CORPUS app. at A-46 (1989)).
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exceptional lawyers but who are willing to devote their attention
exclusively to capital cases.
By using specialists, the system can reduce the number of
reversals and thereby cut the costs of capital cases. Relying on highly
skilled and ethical trial lawyers can transfer more of the costs of the
death penalty from the appellate end of capital cases—where they do
little good—and place them at the trial stage. Such an approach would
not only reduce the costs and length of appeal, but it would also
restore faith in the system and hopefully reduce the likelihood of
wrongful convictions.
Because most counties are far too small to staff an elite unit of
capital prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges, a statewide approach
is necessary. Handling death penalty cases at the state level would
have the benefit of not just a wider pool of talent, but also the ability
to equalize capital cases across the state. At present, some counties
lack the resources to seek the death penalty even when the defendant
truly deserves it, while other counties have the financial ability to
seek the death penalty even in marginal cases. The geographic
arbitrariness of the death penalty could be greatly minimized by
utilizing a centralized charging system in which the same small group
of prosecutors reviews all cases in which death is a potential
punishment. If all capital cases are handled by an elite group of state
prosecutors, there will be a constant group of attorneys to make
capital charging decisions without regard to money.
An elite statewide unit of capital lawyers will not solve all of
the problems with the death penalty. However, it could go far toward
improving the quality of defense counsel, reducing prosecutorial
misconduct, equalizing charging across the state, shifting
expenditures from appeals to trials, reducing the risk of convicting the
innocent, shortening the delay between conviction and execution, and
generally restoring confidence in the death penalty system.

